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Tephra hazards can cause widespread impacts to buildings which reduce available 
housing and commercial activities during post-eruption recovery and create a large 
burden on insurance and construction sectors. Impacts can be reduced by undertaking 
loss assessments to inform pre-eruption recovery planning but limited understanding 
of how vulnerable buildings are to certain aspects of tephra hazard makes accurate 
loss assessments challenging. The objectives of this thesis are to develop quantitative 
methods to assess building vulnerability to ballistic and tephra fall hazards which can 
then be used to inform tephra impact assessments in Auckland, New Zealand. 
 
To achieve these objectives building vulnerability has been quantified through the 
development of fragility and vulnerability functions. These functions can be used to 
relate hazard intensity (i.e. tephra fall thickness) with what assets are exposed (i.e. 
residential buildings) to predict impact. Development of new fragility functions has 
used data from post-eruption building surveys at Mt Ontake and Mt Usu, review of 
relevant literature, and novel ballistic cannon experiments. A total of 93 experiments 
were carried out on 4 roof and wall claddings commonly used in New Zealand 
construction, impacted by dense volcanic rocks moving at up to 39 m/s. The claddings 
were highly vulnerable to perforation by perpendicular impacts but were able to deflect 
oblique impacts to receive significantly less damage. The velocity of building material 
fragments ejected during experiments was also measured with implications for life 
safety. Conducting and analysing these experiments represents the first known 
attempt at quantifying building vulnerability to ballistics using fragility functions.  
 
The fragility and vulnerability functions developed from this research were then used 
in an impact assessment to determine likely building damage and insurance losses for 
a credible Auckland Volcanic Field (AVF) eruption scenario. The eruption modelled 
significant damage to buildings located within 3 km of the eruptive centre. In the 
ballistic impact assessment, over 800 ballistics directly impacted 486 buildings. Most 
impacts were modelled to have caused cladding perforation (maximum damage), but 
the overall damaged area on all impacted buildings was small enough that repairs are 
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likely to be economic. In the tephra impact assessment over 200,000 buildings were 
impacted by >0.1 mm of ash with repair costs from structural damage estimated at 
$0.4-1.2 billion. However 97% of buildings impacted did not receive tephra loads 
sufficient to cause structural damage. Therefore non-structural damage is a large 
source of uncertainty in the impact assessment.  
 
The results from the literature review, building surveys, experiments and modelling 
have implications for response (e.g. life safety actions) and recovery planning (e.g. 
building repairs, building waste disposal) as part of disaster risk reduction in Auckland 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Context of the study 
Volcanic  eruptions  are  violent,  uncontrollable  events  which  produce  hazards that 
can impact on all aspects of society, including buildings. The most destructive volcanic 
hazards include pyroclastic density currents, volcanogenic tsunamis  and lahars which 
account for 71% of recorded deaths associated  with  volcanic  eruptions (Auker et al., 
2013). Tephra fall on the other hand is more of a disruptive hazard, being the most 
common and geographically widespread volcanic hazard but associated with only 3% 
of recorded deaths (Simkin et al., 2001; Auker et al., 2013). Due to the widespread 
nature of this hazard, it has the potential to cause disruption and damage to buildings 
over large geographic areas, leading to serious societal impacts (Wilson et al., 2012). 
Fortunately, previous eruptions from around the world have shown that these impacts 
can be reduced with proactive, pre-event risk management.  
Volcanic risk management has successfully reduced the number of deaths associated 
with volcanic hazards through increased public education and increased volcanic 
surveillance contributing to more effective warnings and evacuations (ESCAP, 1999). 
In the past, research into assessing and reducing volcanic risk has typically been 
focussed on analysis of the hazard itself (Douglas, 2007). This has allowed the 
implementation of engineering solutions and more thoughtful land use planning prior 
to eruptions. However, compared to the research on volcanic phenomena which cause 
hazards, much less attention has been given to the impacts of the hazards to different 
sectors of society (e.g. critical infrastructure, agriculture and buildings (Green and 
Rose, 2005; Wilson, 2015)).  To evaluate and mitigate the risk to an exposed asset, 
consideration of hazard alone is not sufficient. Consideration of the asset’s 
vulnerability (propensity to suffer impact) is also required (Figure 1). This has been 
identified as a critical need to achieve more effective volcanic risk management 




Figure 1: The three key components of risk/impact assessment. 
 
One negative impact which contributes to volcanic disasters are impacts to buildings 
which can reduce available housing and commercial activities during the post-eruption 
recovery and place a heavy burden on insurance and construction sectors. Accurately 
assessing the likely extent of building damage and insurance losses prior to eruption 
can lessen impacts by informing pre-event recovery planning. Unfortunately there are 
certain volcanic hazards for which our understanding of building vulnerability is 
relatively limited, making accurate impact assessments challenging. Not all volcanic 
hazards require a detailed understanding of how they impact buildings. For example, 
highly destructive hazards such as lahars and lava flows can be considered to have 
binary impacts meaning if the hazard is present it will destroy any building it impacts 
but if the hazard is absent, it will not impact at all . Tephra fall and ballistic hazards can 
cause a wider variety of impacts. Heavy tephra falls and ballistic projectiles can 
destroy buildings which are relatively close to the vent but impacts can still occur >100 
kilometres away with light tephra falls causing non-structural damage to a larger 
numbers of exposed buildings (Blong, 1984; Wilson et al., 2012) (Throughout this 
thesis tephra fall and ballistics are collectively referred to as tephra, with tephra fall 
pertaining to volcanic ejecta that settles out of an eruption plume and ballistics 
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pertaining to ejecta that is too large to be convected into a plume and is therefore 
ejected with a near parabolic, ballistic trajectory).  
Most tephra-building impacts research focusses on structural damage caused by 
heavy tephra fall loads (e.g. Zuccaro et al., 2008; Jenkins and Spence, 2009; Maqsood 
et al., 2015). This is likely due to situations where there are high building densities in 
close proximity to active stratovolcanoes (as is the case at Vesuvius or Pinatubo for 
example (Spence et al., 1996; Zuccaro et al., 2008)). Tephra fall from largescale 
eruptions in these areas can cause damage or collapse to large numbers of buildings. 
This is an issue because building repairs can constitute a costly and time consuming 
stage of recovery following major disasters (e.g. Mount Pinatubo 1991, (Spence et al., 
1996); Rabaul 1994, (Blong, 2003) and the Christchurch earthquake sequence 2010-
2011,(Doherty, 2011)) and because heavy tephra loads can cause catastrophic roof 
collapse potentially injuring or killing any sheltering occupants (Pomonis et al., 1999; 
Spence et al., 2005a). 
However for most eruptions, tephra falls are too light to cause widespread structural 
damage. In the Auckland context for example, tephra falls from AVF eruptions are 
expected to be relatively light and therefore unlikely to cause extensive structural 
damage (Magill et al., 2006a; Magill et al., 2006b). Despite this, risk assessments have 
identified tephra fall as the most significant hazard facing the Auckland region. This is 
because high building density means heavy tephra falls and ballistics can cause 
severe impacts close to the vent (Houghton et al., 2006) and because light tephra falls 
from AVF eruptions or other volcanoes and volcanic centres further afield (e.g. Mt 
Taranaki, Okataina volcanic centre, Tongariro volcanic centre (Magill and Blong, 
2005)) can still cause widespread damage and disruption to non-structural building 
components. Knowledge on the vulnerability of these components to light tephra falls 
is largely qualitative and requires further investigation. A second aspect of tephra fall 
impacts which requires investigation given Auckland’s high building density and the 
unknown location of future eruptive vents, are the impacts associated with relatively 
short ranged but highly destructive ballistic impacts. These impacts form a large 
source of uncertainty in Auckland’s volcanic risk assessments because little is known 
about how vulnerable buildings are to ballistics. By undertaking a quantitative 
assessment of building vulnerability to these aspects of tephra fall impacts, uncertainty 
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can be reduced resulting in more accurate risk assessments and the adoption of more 
appropriate risk mitigation measures. 
This thesis aims to improve the quantification of tephra-building vulnerability with a 
focus on quantifying the vulnerability of Auckland’s buildings to both tephra fall and 
ballistic hazards from locally sourced AVF eruptions. Depending on the vent location 
of the next AVF eruption, many buildings may be damaged or destroyed, leading to 
significant repair and reconstruction costs during the recovery phase of the disaster. 
Quantification of building vulnerability can also identify which buildings are the most 
resilient to impacts and which could benefit most from mitigation measures. This 
information may be invaluable for anyone forced to shelter-in-place in the event of a 
short lead in time prior to the next AVF eruption (with minimum times estimated as low 
as 5 hours (Blake et al., 2006)). Quantification of tephra-building vulnerability can be 
achieved by following the processes outlined in the risk management framework 
below. 
 
1.2 Applying a risk management framework to building 
vulnerability assessment 
The following risk management framework is used globally as a common guideline for 
organisations and research groups seeking to reduce risk in a logical and consistent 
manner. In the framework set out by Standards New Zealand (2009), risk management 
may be achieved following risk assessment and treatment. Risk assessment has three 
stages, these are risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation (Figure 2). This 
framework provides risk managers with a systematic approach as they contribute to 
volcanic risk management. As such, this thesis will adhere to the framework with a 
focus on risk assessment by following the three stages: identifying, analysing and 





Figure 2: Diagram of the risk management framework (from Standards New Zealand , 2009) 
 
Figure 3 relates terms used in the risk management framework. In this thesis, hazard 
is defined as the probability of a specific volcanic phenomena occurring with the 
potential to adversely affect society (e.g. tephra fall on a city) (Blong, 2000). 
Vulnerability expresses the degree to which elements (e.g. people, buildings, etc.) are 
likely to be impacted when exposed to hazard (Douglas, 2007). Risk is the combination 
of these two factors; the probability the hazard will occur and the expected impact to 
exposed elements. 
 
Figure 3: Conceptual relationship between hazard, exposure, vulnerability and risk. After Crozier and 
Glade (2006). 
1.2.1 Establishing the context 
To be effective, the risk assessment process first requires establishment of the risk 
context (Standards New Zealand, 2009). This involves an organization articulating its 
risk management scope, goals and strategies. This planning is required to identify and 
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justify the resources that will be used during the risk management process. 
Establishing the context also helps ensure that the risk management approach 
adopted is appropriate to the organization and to the obstacles that may affect the 
achievement of its objectives (Standards New Zealand, 2009).  
 
1.2.2 Risk identification  
After the context has been established, the risk management process begins with risk 
identification. Risk identification requires initial identification of hazard, which typically 
involves reviewing literature and completing geologic investigations to characterise the 
previous spatial and temporal occurrences of hazards in the area (Kaye, 2008). Once 
hazards have been characterised, all of the exposed elements and their potential 
vulnerabilities should to be identified. Risk identification is required to identify all the 
issues that need further investigation in the risk analysis stage (Crozier and Glade, 
2006).   
For this thesis, risk identification involves identifying potential tephra fall hazards within 
Auckland and characterising how they can impact on Auckland’s buildings. This 
involves an assessment of the magnitude and the spatial distribution of tephra from 
past AVF eruptions combined with a review of how tephra fall has impacted buildings 
in previous eruptions from around the world. 
 
1.2.3 Risk analysis and evaluation 
Risk analysis develops an understanding of how hazards interact with exposed 
elements based on their vulnerability (e.g. Figure 1). Combining these three 
components through geospatial modelling forms the basis of risk assessments (King 
and Bell, 2009). Risk assessments may use deterministic or probabilistic models or a 
combination of both. Deterministic, scenario based assessments use theoretical 
eruption scenarios, which are backed up by data from previous eruptions to estimate 
the impacts of volcanic hazards on exposed elements. These assessments can only 
focus on one scenario at a time for which they give definite ‘yes it will occur/no it won’t 
occur’ type answers as opposed to quantifying the likelihood of the risks from the range 
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of possible scenarios (Haneberg, 2000). The latter can be achieved by moving towards 
probabilistic risk assessments.  
Probabilistic risk assessments are used to model a range of scenarios and are capable 
of calculating the overall probability of a hazard occurring with its associated damage 
for a specific location. These assessments are better at modelling complex interactive 
hazards over a range of magnitudes and they require less subjective input. To quantify 
the likely impact caused by hazards, fragility functions can be used to characterize 
vulnerability in probabilistic risk assessments. Fragility functions relate hazard 
intensity to the expected impact severity experienced by a specific element of interest. 
For example, several tephra fall fragility functions for buildings relate tephra fall loading 
(kPa) to the probability of roof collapse for specific building types. Fragility functions 
provide the crucial calculation link between hazard and vulnerability in a quantitative, 
non-subjective manner, making them powerful risk assessment tools.  
 
1.2.4 Risk evaluation 
Risk evaluation is the final stage of risk assessment. It involves consideration of 
different risks so they can be compared and ranked. This helps to determine what 
actions should be taken for risk reduction. In the context of tephra fall impacts to 
buildings risk evaluation should ideally aim to answer the following questions: 
 What are the insurance and repair costs associated with tephra impacts to 
Auckland’s buildings? 
 What loss of functionality will buildings experience?  
 How long will building repairs last?  
 What strengthening or new building guidelines could be made to reduce 
impacts? 
These are important questions which are difficult to answer with any certainty. 
However, the assessment of vulnerability conducted in this thesis can help to reduce 




1.2.5 Risk treatment 
Risk treatment is the final stage of the risk management process. It takes advantage 
of the knowledge gained during risk assessment (identification; analysis; evaluation) 
to decide how best to reduce the hazard and/or the exposure and vulnerability that 
comprise risk. Volcanic hazards are powerful naturally occurring phenomena which 
are not easily managed by human activities, often making it impossible or very difficult 
to reduce the hazard. This means reducing the vulnerability of exposed elements or 
reducing their overall exposure may be more effective. These reductions can be 
achieved through the implementation of various, scientifically tested mitigation 
techniques, into society. Building exposure can be reduced through risk conscious 
land use planning but when it is not practicable to reduce exposure (as is the case in 
Auckland city), reductions in vulnerability can be achieved through strengthening of 
vulnerable system elements. A second way to reduce society’s vulnerability is through 
intensive volcanic surveillance, which can provide warnings prior to impending 
eruptions. This increases the time available for emergency managers to conduct 
evacuations, reducing exposure of people to volcanic hazards (Donovan et al., 2012). 
Lastly, through communicating with at risk groups about the hazards and risks they 
may face during an eruption, these groups can take steps to understand, accept and 
reduce their personal risk to volcanic hazards (Paton et al., 2008). 
 
1.3 Background of Auckland volcanic hazards   
Auckland is unique in being a metropolitan area located on top of an active volcanic 
field. The AVF has produced at least 54 volcanoes over the last 250,000 years with 
most of these  being relatively small and monogenetic in nature (Kereszturi et al., 
2013). This means that each volcano is expected to only erupt once, with magmatic 
feeder systems being too small to stay open over long periods between eruptions so 
each episode of volcanism will break out at its own, distinct site. Although all previous 
eruptions have been constrained within the ~360 km2 elliptical area that comprises the 
AVF (Figure 4), past volcanism does not appear to follow any spatio-temporal patterns 
(Lindsay et al., 2010). This means there is a large uncertainty associated with 
predicting the vent location or the timing of future eruptions. Another source of 
uncertainty in assessing the AVF’s volcanic risk is associated with predicting eruption 
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magnitude. Eruptive volumes from most of the past eruptions have been relatively 
small but they are also highly variable. In total, the field has produced over 1.7 km3 of 
eruptive deposits (dense rock equivalent), of which nearly half was all produced in the 
most recent eruption which formed Mt Rangitoto ~0.6 Ka (Kereszturi et al., 2013).   
Despite magma from all the AVF’s eruptions being in a narrow compositional range, 
past eruptions in the AVF display a wide variety of eruption styles (Allen and Smith, 
1994). These styles range from phreatomagmatic, forming tuff rings and maars, to 
Hawaiian and Strombolian which produce cones and lava flows (Houghton et al., 
1996). Eruption styles control the type and severity hazards produced. Identified 
potential hazards of an AVF eruption include: explosions, earthquakes, base surges, 
cone growth, lava flows and tephra fall.  
 




Any buildings or infrastructure in the area of cone building are expected to be 
completely destroyed and hazards like lava flows typically destroy or bury anything 
they come into contact with (Houghton et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2014). By 
comparison, tephra fall hazards are less destructive but typically much more 
widespread. Thus, depending on the style of eruption, tephra fall hazards present a 
significant risk to the Auckland building stock.  Aspects of AVF tephra fall and ballistic 
hazards are outlined below but for more detailed review tephra fall and ballistic 
dispersal patterns in relation to their hazard, refer to Appendix A.  
Although large thickness tephra falls are possible within Auckland, lighter falls between 
1-10 mm occur more frequently and are not expected to cause structural damage to 
buildings (Magill and Blong, 2005; Magill et al., 2006a). Lake cores taken within 
Auckland have identified 70 distal tephra fall deposits ranging from 0.5-630 mm (Green 
et al., 2014). From probabilistic modelling the most likely source of tephra fall in 
Auckland is not from the AVF but from Mt Taranaki, with most thicknesses between 1- 
10 mm and a mean thickness of 1.7 mm across Auckland  (Magill et al., 2006b; Hurst 
and Smith, 2010). Though relatively less likely to occur, large thickness tephra falls up 
to a maximum of 150 mm have been modelled for an AVF eruption  (Magill et al., 
2006b).  
In previous AVF eruptions, ballistics have been produced from both ‘wet’ and ‘dry’ 
eruptions (Allen and Smith, 1994). Wet, phreatomagmatic eruptions occur when 
magma intrudes water and/wet sediment. They are more explosive than dry eruptions 
and based on the presence of significant aquifers, relatively high present day sea level 
and water-saturated Miocene sedimentary rock throughout Auckland, there is a high 
probability that a future AVF eruption will begin with a phreatomagmatic phase (Sandri 
et al., 2012). Based on studies of eruption deposits, ballistics are expected to be 
restricted within a 1-3 km radius of the vent during phreatomagmatic eruptions (Allen 
and Smith, 1994). During less explosive, ‘dry’ Strombolian or Hawaiian eruptions 
ballistics are expected to have a shorter range. This has been captured in the range 
of ballistic particles from two ballistic hazard models developed for a Strombolian and 
a Vulcanian scale phreatic eruption in Auckland (Chapter 4). The models have been 
developed using the Tsunematsu ballistic trajectory model (Tsunematsu et al., 2014) 
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and parameterised using studies of AVF ballistic deposits and analogous eruptions 
from more intensely studied volcanoes. Although several studies have investigated 
the probabilistic tephra fall risk to Auckland (e.g. Magill et al., 2006b; Hurst and Smith, 
2010), they do not rank the risk from ballistics as very highly due to their relatively 
limited dispersal. Also there have been no probabilistic risk models specifically for 
ballistic impacts perhaps due to ballistics being regarded as a highly destructive 
hazard which will destroy any buildings they come into contact with (Magill and Blong, 
2005).   
Volcanic fields such as the AVF typically remain active for around 1 million years, 
meaning it is expected the AVF has many eruptions still to come and with a current 
trend of increased activity and  higher volume volcanism during the last 40 Ka 
(Kereszturi et al., 2013). Despite this trend, AVF eruptions are still categorised as 
relatively low magnitude and low frequency events with probabilistic hazard models 
suggesting that an eruption occurs approximately once every 1,200 years (Hurst and 
Smith, 2010). This means Auckland has a higher likelihood of being impacted by 
tephra falls from distal volcanism than from an AVF eruption. However, due to the 
heavily populated and developed environment directly above the field, highly 
destructive proximal volcanic hazards from a local AVF eruptions have the potential to 
bear higher consequence.   
The magma source beneath Auckland is at least 30 kilometres deep (Horspool et al., 
2006). Based on magma ascent rates from suitable analogue eruptions, a warning 
time of 1-2 weeks between the onset of monitored seismicity and magma outbreak at 
the surface is expected (Blake et al., 2006). However, the report by Blake et al. (2006) 
also modelled the magma ascent rates through dikes and found that 0.3 m wide dikes 
could transport magma at up to 6 m/s giving a lead in times of less than 5 hours. If this 
scenario was to occur, evacuations are unlikely to be properly coordinated and people 
may be required to shelter-in-place inside suitable buildings. The longer 1-2 week 
warning time will hopefully give emergency planners time to identify and evacuate the 
zone surrounding the expected vent location to minimise loss of life. Building damage 
cannot be prevented in the same manner so it is important for researchers to provide 
a clearer picture of the impacts that can be expected to Auckland’s building stock 
following an eruption as this can aid in pre-event disaster recovery planning. A large 
source of uncertainty in any such risk assessment is the current lack of understanding 
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surrounding how vulnerable different types of buildings and their critical building 
elements are to tephra fall hazards.  
 
1.4 Aims and objectives 
The main aim of this research is to quantify the vulnerability of a variety of building 
types to tephra fall hazards, helping to make volcanic risk assessments more accurate. 
This aim is aligned with the primary aim of volcanologists being to “use and improve 
the science for public safety and welfare” (Newhall et al., 1999). 
The objectives of this research are:  
1. To develop a framework that guides the derivation of tephra fall and ballistic fragility 
functions for buildings. 
 
2. To improve understanding of building vulnerability to tephra hazard by deriving new 
tephra fall and ballistic fragility functions for New Zealand buildings using data from 
review of previous impacts research, experimental and field based studies. 
 
3. To use the new fragility functions in assessing tephra impacts to Auckland’s 
buildings by undertaking a deterministic impact assessment using a credible AVF 
eruption scenario.    
 
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
To achieve these objectives, the main body of the thesis has a structure that aligns 
with the risk/impact assessment concept outlined in Figure 5. 
 Chapter 1 has introduced the thesis and its scope and it has established the 
context of tephra hazards in Auckland.   
 Chapter 2 presents a framework for deriving tephra fall and ballistic fragility 
functions for buildings. This framework:  




o Identifies the key aspects of hazard and vulnerability which influence the 
impacts associated with each hazard. 
o Critically reviews the previously developed tephra fall and ballistic 
fragility and vulnerability functions for buildings. 
o Identifies different sources of data required to produce functions, 
provides a function derivation methodology and then follows the 
methodology to derive new functions for tephra fall and ballistic impacts 
buildings.   
 Chapter 3 presents the results and analysis of experiments used to derive new 
ballistic fragility functions for New Zealand buildings. Experimental design has 
been informed by analysis of the most common building types in Auckland and 
by findings from recent ballistic impact assessment trips to two Japanese 
volcanoes. The experiments involved destructive materials testing on various 
building claddings using an air cannon which ejects rocks to simulate ballistic 
hazard.     
 Finally Chapter 4 utilises the fragility functions developed in Chapters 2 and 3 
to  undertake a deterministic impact assessment for tephra fall and ballistic 
hazard impacts to Auckland’s building stock.  
 
Figure 5: Chapter alignment with the impact/risk assessment concept.  
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Chapter 2 Framework for the Development of 
Tephra-building Fragility Functions 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Effective volcanic risk management requires an understanding of the vulnerability of 
assets exposed to volcanic hazards. Although there are a range of different methods 
that can be used to assess vulnerability, this thesis focusses on quantifying 
vulnerability through the development of fragility functions for use in a quantitative risk 
assessment. The quantitative assessment of vulnerability of buildings to natural 
hazards such as tsunami, earthquake, flooding and hurricane is typically determined 
through the development of fragility and/or vulnerability functions (see section 1.2.3) 
(Rossetto et al., 2014; Maqsood et al., 2015; Tarbotton et al., 2015). For tephra fall 
hazards there have been relatively few fragility and vulnerability functions developed 
and they are often only applicable to the local building stock they were developed for, 
thereby limiting their use in impact assessments. Previously developed functions have 
largely focussed on structural damage and roof collapse associated with heavy tephra 
loads. Available functions rarely consider other aspects of tephra-building impacts 
such as damage to non-structural building components from light tephra falls or 
perforations caused by ballistic impacts. This chapter reviews previous instances of 
tephra impacts to buildings, critically reviews the currently available tephra-building 
fragility functions and provides a framework for developing new functions. The purpose 
of this review is to identify gaps in current knowledge of building vulnerability to tephra 
hazards and provide direction to the development of new fragility functions for New 
Zealand buildings.  
 
This chapter’s structure follows that of the framework’s which is outlined in Figure 6. 
The first section provides an overview of fragility and vulnerability functions,  their 
dependant and independent variables, and the main sources of data used to develop 
functions for buildings impacted by tephra hazards. The next section reviews the 
impact data available from previous instances of tephra impacts to buildings and 
identifies the key aspects of tephra fall and ballistic hazards which enable them to 
cause impacts to buildings. Then, a method for function fitting that requires only a 
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limited number of data points is outlined.  The documentation stage of function 
development is then outlined. Documentation provides transparency so end users may 
understand how reliable the functions are and how best to implement them or update 
them as more data becomes available (Rossetto et al., 2014; Wilson et al. in review). 
The framework presented in Figure 6 provides a systematic approach to developing 
fragility functions. It is based upon similar frameworks used in vulnerability 
assessments for many natural hazards including tsunami (e.g. Tarbotton et al., 2015), 
earthquake (Rossetto et al., 2014), hurricane (e.g. Barbato et al. 2013) and volcanic 
(e.g. Wilson et al.in review). The final stage of function development is the 
incorporation of functions into risk assessments or  risk assessment software (e.g. 
RiskScape(King and Bell, 2009) or HAZUS-MH (FEMA, 2003)). Implementing these 
fragility functions into RiskScape will enable a more accurate assessment of tephra 
impacts to buildings in New Zealand.  
 




2.2 Introduction to fragility and vulnerability functions 
Fragility and vulnerability functions are commonly used in risk assessments to 
translate an assessed level of hazard to an estimated level of impact (damage and 
disruption) for a given asset of interest. Fragility functions and vulnerability differ in the 
way they represent impacts (Figure 7).  Vulnerability functions correlate hazard 
intensity to an asset’s expected mean damage or functionality loss where the overall 
impact to a structure is represented in one of two ways. Either 1) as an index (e.g. 
damage ratio – cost to repair : cost to replace) or 2) as a percentage relative to total 
impact (e.g. 80% damaged) (Tarbotton et al., 2015). Fragility functions express the 
conditional probability that a pre-defined level of impact will be reached or exceeded 
for a given hazard intensity (measured using an appropriate hazard intensity metric 
(HIM)) (Rossetto et al., 2014; Tarbotton et al., 2015). 
Whether fragility of vulnerability functions are developed is dependent on the nature 
of available impact data and objective of the risk assessments in which they are to be 
used. In the context of this thesis, these functions are used to predict likely building 
damage and associated reconstruction costs caused by tephra hazards produced in 
future AVF eruptions. These predictions can be used to inform pre-event recovery 
planning (e.g. demolition waste management decisions (Hayes, 2014)). They can also 
inform risk mitigation actions such as building strengthening and identifying which 





Figure 7: Illustration of tephra fall-building fragility and vulnerability functions. A) Roof collapse fragility 
functions for different roof typologies from Jenkins and Spence (2009). B) Tephra loading vulnerability 
functions from the United Nations Global Assessment of Risk 2015, (Maqsood et al., 2015). Hazard 
intensity measures and impact metrics and are outlined in the following sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 
respectively. 
   
2.2.1 Damage data  
The data which is required to derive fragility functions is termed here as damage data. 
Damage data is quantitative and relates building damage to hazard intensity. Data 
such as this can be classified into three types: empirical; expert elicitation and 
analytical (Schultz et al., 2010). The advantages and disadvantages of each type are 





Table 1: Advantages and disadvantages associated with using different types of damage data to 
develop fragility and vulnerability functions. Modified from Schultz et al. (2010) and Wilson (2015). 




Can observe impacts to the 
entire building system, true 
representation of hazard 
Data often limited, 
Region/site specific 
construction types, difficult 
to measure hazard intensity 







detailed measurement of 
hazard intensity, control on 
asset type impacted 
Costs (time and resources), 
Difficulties in simulating 
hazard and asset in 
laboratory environment 





Easily repeatable once 
models are developed, 
models can be altered and 
extrapolated to new building 
types 
Models based on 
simplifications and 
assumptions, requires 
empirical data for validation 
Pomonis et al, 
1999; Zuccaro 
et al, 2008 
Expert elicitation 
Can rely on judgement to 
refine other functions, not 
limited by lack of data 
Differing levels of expertise, 
differing or contradictory 
opinions, requires empirical 





Empirical data includes measurable observations of damage at different hazard 
intensities either from previous volcanic eruptions (post-eruption impact data) or 
controlled laboratory experiments. Post-eruption impact data has the advantage of 
providing a true representation of the diverse range of impacts that volcanic hazards 
cause to real buildings. However because impacts are rarely directly measured for 
safety reasons and because eruptions are infrequent events, data are often scarce or 
of variable quality and the impacts may only be applicable to the building typologies in 
the impacted region (Douglas, 2007; Jenkins et al., 2014; Wilson et al., 2015).  
To date no functions have been produced purely from data gained during post-eruption 
impact assessments. This is likely because no impact assessments have been 
undertaken with the main goal being to specifically produce fragility or vulnerability 
functions and also because post-eruption impact assessments follow a reactive 
research model which rarely allows for in depth analysis into why or how observed 
impacts occurred (Wilson et al., 2012).  
Due to these issues, experimental studies that simulate tephra impacts in a controlled 
laboratory environment work well in conjunction with post-eruption impact studies. 
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They complement post-eruption impact research by allowing for repeatable 
experiments and an in depth analysis of impacts to various building components at a 
range of hazard intensities. The main challenges of experimental studies include their 
generally high cost (in terms of resources and time) and the difficulties of accurately 
replicating complex natural hazards and their impacts to real buildings in a laboratory  
2.2.1.2Analytical data 
Analytical data can be produced using statistical or numerical models that calculate 
building vulnerability at different hazard intensities (Rossetto and Elnashai, 2003; Li 
and Hao, 2014). This approach requires the development of models that accurately 
represent buildings and their vulnerability. However, any modelled results should 
ideally be verified against results from experimental or post-eruption impact studies 
(Maqsood et al., 2015). Pomonis et al (1999)and Zuccaro et al (2008) used numerical 
modelling (based on experimental strength testing of timber and R.C structures 
respectively) to determine vulnerability of Azorean and Neapolitan buildings subjected  
to tephra fall. 
2.2.1.3Expert elicitation data 
When analytical or empirical data are not available or scarce, expert elicitation can be 
used to generate data for vulnerability assessments (Zuccaro et al., 2008; Rossetto et 
al., 2014; Maqsood et al., 2015). Advantages of the elicitation process include its ability 
to draw on expert judgement and logic to refine previously developed functions or to 
develop new functions with limited data by combining data from different sources 
(Wilson, 2015). Disadvantages such as the differing levels of expertise, contradicting 
opinions and subjectivity can be overcome using a range of averaging or weighted 
averaging methods (Aspinall and Cooke, 2013).   
 
2.2.2  Hazard intensity measures (HIMs) 
A hazard intensity meaure (HIM) is used to quantify the intensity of a hazard and is 
the independent variable for both vulnerability and fragility functions. Tephra fall and 
ballistic hazards have a number of different measurable properties which can be used 
to express intensity and different properties are responsible for different mechanisms 
of building damage. This means that although no single HIM can capture all of the 
impactful attributes for either of these hazards, some measures correlate with damage 
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more strongly than others (Wilson et al., 2014). Therefore, the selection of a suitable 
HIM is an important step in fragility or vulnerability function development. In addition 
to the HIM’s ability to describe the range of possible building damage, ideally they 
should also be easily measurable in the field or in the laboratory, be easily incorporated 
into existing hazard models and have also been recorded in existing impact 
databases. For tephra fall the most common HIMs are thickness or mass loading and 
for ballistics the most common HIMs are impact energy and impact density per unit 
area (Jenkins et al., 2014). 
 
2.2.3 Impact metrics (IMs)   
For functions in this framework, impact metrics (IMs) are used to assess impact 
intensity either for individual buildings or for individual ballistic strikes to buildings. 
Impact metrics are the dependent variable for both types of function and are commonly 
bounded between 0 and 1. As described above the representation of impact metrics 
differs for vulnerability and fragility functions. For vulnerability functions, the IM will 
typically be either an index (e.g. damage ratio – cost to repair : cost to replace) or a 
percentage relative to total impact (e.g. 80% damaged)).  
For fragility functions the IM is the probability that a building will be impacted to (or 
exceed) a specified level of impact. Successive levels of impact are expressed semi-
qualitatively using descriptions of building damage state (DS) or impact state (IS). 
Ideally for each type of asset a suite of fragility functions are developed with one 
function for each DS/IS. Given that DSs and ISs are sequential, (i.e. if DS2 has 
occurred this implies that DS1 has occurred), then the probability of being equal to a 
specific DS can be calculated from the difference between consecutive DSs at a given 




Figure 8: Illustration of the probability of occurrence calculation for each impact state at 10 mm tephra 
thickness. Functions are for impacts to electricity transmission sites. Figure from Wilson (2015).   
 
2.3 Previous instances of tephra fall and ballistic impacts to 
buildings 
In previous tephra risk assessment studies, the incorporation of quantitative impact 
data and vulnerability assessments are often not well established, especially in 
comparison to earthquake risk assessments (Douglas, 2007). Effective risk 
assessment requires consideration of hazard, exposure and vulnerability but 
compared to the sophistication of probabilistic tephra fall hazard models (e.g. 
Bonadonna et al., 2005; Hurst and Smith, 2010) and ballistic hazard models (e.g. 
Tsunematsu et al., 2014), tephra vulnerability models are lagging. As a result few, if 
any fragility functions have been developed for certain aspects of tephra impacts. To 
improve the state of vulnerability assessments, studies that investigate tephra impacts 
need to provide quantitative data and present it in a way that datasets from multiple 
studies may be combined and potentially be developed into fragility or vulnerability 
functions.  Although there is limited quantitative empirical data available from previous 
instances of tephra impacts to buildings, qualitative evidence can be used to gain an 
understanding of the range of key vulnerability indicators for buildings and aspects of 
the hazard that enable them to cause impacts. The following sections outline previous 
instances of both tephra hazards and the key aspects of hazard and vulnerability that 
influence their impacts. 
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2.3.1 Tephra fall impacts to buildings 
As tephra fall can be a widespread hazard, deposited with varying thicknesses in 
different areas (See Appendix A), it has the potential to impact large numbers of 
buildings in a variety of different ways. Impacts can be separated broadly into 
structural and non-structural damage. Structural damage is primarily dependent on 
tephra fall load (kPa) and the impacted building’s load bearing capacity. Non-structural 
damage can affect a large number of building components and a number of factors 
control the damage mechanisms. A more detailed examination of factors influencing 
non-structural impacts is presented in section 2.3.1.3.     
Several eruptions that have caused tephra fall impacts to buildings are outlined in 
(Table 2). The most studied tephra fall induced damage to buildings is the collapse of 
roofs under thick (> 100 mm) falls, and so these tend to dominate known accounts of 
tephra impacts to buildings (e.g. Spence et al., 1996; Pomonis et al., 1999; Blong, 
2003; Zuccaro et al., 2008; Jenkins and Spence, 2009).  
 
Table 2:  Examples of tephra fall impacts to buildings ordered by increasing thickness. 
Eruption 
Uncompacted tephra 





Thousands of houses 
exposed to < 5 mm of 
tephra. Insurance claims 
for 213 houses for damage 
to roofs, gutters and drains 
Trebilco, 1997 
PCC, 2011 <10 mm 
Widespread ongoing ash 
ingress into buildings 
following wind 
remobilisation  
Wilson et al., 
2013 
PCC, 2011 15-17 mm 
16 houses suffered roof 
collapse and 40 were 
braced to prevent collapse 
54 km from the vent 
Wilson et al., 
2013 
Usu, 2000 10-20 
Ash ingress through 
ballistic perforations to 
>100 buildings  




Not reported  
(~10 -20) 
Damage to gutters, down 
spouts, interior floors etc. 
Dillman and 
Roberts, 1982 
Tambora, 1815 95 Roofs collapsed Anon, 1816 
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200 mm (wet) 
51 buildings surveyed: 15 
had no damage,  
3 had light damage and 33 
were collapsed or severely 
damaged 
Spence et al., 
1996 







corrosion of sheet metal 
roofs through to collapse 
across 173 buildings 
Blong, 2003 
Eldjfell, 1973 <100 
Collapse of flat roofs on 
strong buildings 
Booth, 1979 
Eldjfell, 1973 2000-4000 





2.3.1.1 Factors influencing structural tephra fall impacts to buildings 
By reviewing previous instances of tephra fall impacts to buildings, several of the 
factors influencing structural tephra fall impacts to buildings have been identified. 
These include the building’s cladding type and cladding support systems, roof span 
and pitch, the tephra deposit’s load, and environmental conditions (particularly rainfall) 
before during and after tephra is deposited on a building (Hampton et al., 2015; 
Maqsood et al., 2015; Wilson et al., 2015a). 
Structural impacts include roof sagging and roof, wall or building collapse caused by 
excessive tephra loading typically onto the building’s roof. Therefore, the two primary 
factors controlling the extent of structural damage to a building are its superimposed 





Figure 9: Factors controlling the extent of tephra fall induced structural building damage. Processes 
with colour gradients signify the process is controlled by a combination of factors including tephra 
hazard (red), exposure (blue) and/or climate (orange).  
Tephra loading is measured from the thickness and bulk density of a roof’s tephra 
deposit (See equation in section 4.2.4.1). A deposit’s bulk density will vary between 
different eruptions or for changing conditions of the same eruption, such as a transition 
in eruption style or if a dry tephra deposit becomes saturated with rainwater 
(Macedonio and Costa, 2012). Many factors control deposit thickness but generally, 
thickness decreases with distance from the eruptive vent. If 100% of tephra settling on 
a roof remains accumulated there, then its actual loading and maximum loading are 
the same (Figure 9). In most cases however, a percentage of the tephra deposit will 
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be shed (Pomonis et al., 1999; Hampton et al., 2015). Four mechanisms for tephra 
shedding include:  
1) Tephra sliding under gravity,  
2) Wind remobilisation,  
3) Washing by rain or  
4) Manual removal.  
Hampton et al (2015) conducted experiments investigating the effect of roof pitch on 
tephra’s ability to slide from corrugated iron roofs and found that at pitches of 35° or 
higher, significant amounts of dry tephra would slide from clean, dry roofs. Blong 
(1981) identified wind remobilisation as a potential means for a tephra load to become 
unevenly distributed across roofs but didn’t point out the possibility that wind could 
also remove tephra from the roof all together. In terms of wind speed thresholds for 
remobilisation, wind tunnel testing of loose dry tephra from the 1980 Mt St Helens 
eruption became suspended at speeds ranging from 6-12 km/h depending on tephra 
surface smoothness (Fowler and Lopushinsky, 1986). However, if fine tephra 
becomes wet it may form a firm surface, stabilising itself against wind speeds <69 
km/h (Wilson et al., 2011). Rainfall has the potential to either decrease or increase 
loading. Loading can increase by up to 100% when tephra becomes saturated with 
water (Macedonio and Costa, 2012), but conversely, loads may decrease if sustained 
rainfall is able to wash tephra from roofs (Hampton et al., 2015). In an eruption, if 
buildings being impacted by tephra are outside of evacuation zones and tephra 
accumulation rates are not exceedingly high, building owners may be able to 
periodically remove tephra from roofs manually as it falls, preventing excessive loads 
from accumulating. However, cleaning tephra from roofs presents new problems such 
as people placing themselves at risk of falls from height (Blong, 1984) or because the 
removal process can at times cause additional damage (e.g. from ladders being 
braced against roof gutters (Dillman and Roberts, 1982) or from people standing on 
roofs and increasing the live load during removal (Blong, 1984)).    
Once the residual tephra loading on a building’s roof has been established, the other 
primary factor influencing structural damage severity is the building’s load bearing 
capacity. A roof will collapse when tephra load exceeds either the strength of the roof 
cladding or the cladding’s supporting structure or both (Jenkins et al., 2014). Following 
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the 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo, Jenkins et al. (1996) conducted surveys on 51 
buildings impacted by tephra fall and found the most significant indicator of structural 
building damage to be the roof’s supporting structure. Of the 12 buildings they 
surveyed with roof spans of over 5 metres, 75% were severely damaged compared to 
16% for short-span roofs. For three different roof designs identified for timber framed 
buildings in the Azores Pomonis et al. (1999) used a combination of strength tests, 
elasticity tests and numerical modelling to calculate expected roof failure loads and 
found that the strongest roofs were those using the thickest framing members spaced 
the least distance apart. Flat roofs are also generally more susceptible to loading 
damage than pitched roofs which transfer loads more efficiently down into their walls 
(Booth, 1979; Pomonis et al., 1999).  
The number of storeys a building has also affects its overall vulnerability to tephra fall 
impacts (Marti et al., 2008; Maqsood et al., 2015). If for example a multi-storey building 
experiences roof collapse this may only cause serious damage to the uppermost 
storey of the building. This is because catastrophic failure of subsequent floors is 
assumed to be unlikely due to floors having already been designed to bear loads which 
are heavier than that of the roof’s. Also in cases of extreme tephra falls such as the 
1973 Eldjfell eruption, multi-storey buildings are less vulnerable to complete burial 
(Booth, 1979).    
Finally the age and by association, the condition of the building plays a role in load 
bearing capacity by effecting the building’s overall strength (Jenkins et al., 
2014).Newer or cleaner metal roofs are also more likely have a smooth surface to 
facilitate tephra shedding (Hampton et al., 2015).  
2.3.1.2 Impacts to Non-Structural Building components  
From the examples of tephra fall impacts in Table 2, there appears to be a pattern of 
studies prior to the 1980 eruption of Mount St Helens focusing on severe structural 
building damage which typically did not occur for tephra thicknesses <100 mm. Non-
structural damage on the other hand can occur for tephra thicknesses as low as 1-2 
mm (Johnston, 1997). This means that for any given eruption, non-structural damage 
has the potential to be significantly more widespread than structural damage. In this 
case the issue of tephra fall impacts shifts from one of life safety and large repair costs 
for a select group of heavily impacted buildings into an issue of cumulative damage to 
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the overall building stock. This could present problems to a wide range of groups from 
the community level through to insurers and the construction industry (e.g. Canterbury 
earthquake sequence 2010-2011, Doherty, 2011). Several post-eruption impact 
studies have investigated the impact of light tephra falls to non-structural building 
components and experimental studies provide further insight into the vulnerability of 
some of these components.    
Following the 1980 Mount St Helens eruption, Dillman and Roberts (1982) used data 
gathered from 900 households in eastern Washington State to report on the damage 
caused to various parts of their property. Nearly half of the respondants (48%) reported 
no housing-related damage at all but for those who did, the majority of reported 
damage was for gutters, roof coatings and downspouts. In the same eruption, about 
10 mm (~0.1 kPa loading) of tephra fell on the city of Yakima and insurance payments 
averaged between $300-$400 and 90% or more of the cost was attributed to the labour 
and cleaning (Dillman and Roberts, 1982). During the clean up process, roofs were 
damaged by snow shovels and by having to support the live loads of cleaners which 
were in many cases, over 100 times heavier than the tephra load itself (Blong, 1984). 
This serves as an example of light tephra fall’s capacity to produce almost negligible 
direct physical damage to buildings whilst still incurring significant costs.  
2.3.1.2.1 Impacts to roof gutters 
Hampton et al. (2015) summarised known historical impacts to roofs and gutters from 
6 eruptions and also conducted experiments into roof gutter damage caused by tephra 
loading under wet and dry conditions. The review found that in several cases removing 
tephra from gutters had prevented blockages and damage but that occasionally, more 
damage was done during the clean-up process than during the eruption itself. The 
experiments found that gutters may be completely filled with dry tephra without failure 
but that wet tephra loads >1.0 and >1.5 kPa caused gutter deformation and failure 
respectively. In terms of tephra loading under different roof pitches and weather 
conditions, dry tephra accumulates on dry roofs at pitches up to 35°, above this pitch 
tephra begins to shed off the roof into gutters and to the ground. Tephra fall can adhere 
to wet roofs, allowing it to accumulate at higher pitches. These experiments provide a 
useful quantitative examination of roof gutter vulnerability under different tephra fall 
and roof pitch scenarios. However, they were conducted only using one type of roof 
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cladding (corrugated metal), shedding tephra into PVC gutters of a specific design. 
Also due to the large quantities of tephra required to carry out these experiments, 
“pseudo ash” particles (milled from basaltic lavas) were used as opposed to real 
tephra. The pseudo ash particles used in these experiments did have realistic 
grainsize distributions but they also had a relatively low surface roughness and a more 
tabulate morphology compared to real tephra which could decrease the pseudo ash’s 
angle of repose and therefore increase deposit’s tendency to shed.  
 
2.3.1.2.2  Impacts to HVAC units 
Another set of critical building components which are vulnerable to tephra impacts are 
heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems. HVAC systems are a critical 
component to any building that requires temperature control to function (e.g. 
telecommunication exchanges and cell sites, medicine stores in hospitals, storage 
facilities that hold perishable food, etc.) (Wilson et al., 2012).  Disruption to HVAC 
systems has occurred from tephra falls as light as 1-2 mm, either by air-intake 
blockage, or by precautionary shut-downs to avoid blockages (Johnston, 1997). To 
better understand tephra fall impacts to HVAC systems, laboratory experiments were 
carried out by Barnard (2009). The experimental results introducing tephra to HVAC 
systems semi-continuously over 15 hours suggested that if air conditioners are 
monitored and regularly maintained following an eruption, they are likely to remain 
viable during light tephra falls (<20 mm). The study also found that modern units which 
are designed to reduce noise with lower internal air flow speeds, were more vulnerable 
than older style units with higher internal air flow speeds. 
 
2.3.1.2.3 Impacts to metal roofs 
Corrosion of metal roof materials by acidic tephra leachates can potentially weaken 
roofs and shorten their lifespan in volcanically active areas. Several studies have 
attributed metal corrosion to volcanic tephra from Sakurijima (Deguchi, 1990), Rabaul 
(Blong, 2003) and Mt Ruapehu (Johnston, 1997). However these assessments were 
observational and lacking quantitative data. Oze et al. (2014) presented results of 
weathering chamber experiments in which different roof metals were subjected to 
tephra leachates for 30 days to investigate possible corrosion damage. The tests could 
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not identify significant corrosion to any of the roofing metal samples and suggest that 
corrosion is a more complex, long term, dynamic process that couldn’t easily be 
reproduced in these experiments. 
2.3.1.2.4 Impacts to building interiors  
Fine ash can penetrate buildings causing a health hazard and damage to contents 
(Wilson et al., 2011; Wilson et al., 2013). Even in well-constructed buildings, fine ash 
can enter through small gaps in windows, doors, walls or through the roof to 
contaminate exposed surfaces. Ash particles suspended inside buildings can be 
breathed in with common impacts to human health including irritation of the eyes, skin 
and respiratory tract. Ash ingress can remain an issue years after eruptions have 
ceased with the possibility for additional episodes of contamination to occur when ash 
deposits become remobilised by wind (Wilson et al., 2011).        
 
2.3.1.3 Factors influencing non-structural tephra fall impacts to buildings 
Compared to structural impacts, there are a wider range of tephra fall induced non-
structural impacts that can occur, mostly due to the number of different building 
elements which are susceptible to impacts. With such a large number of factors 
influencing impacts and the lack of large empirical or analytical impact datasets, it 
becomes challenging to analyse the relationships between hazard and vulnerability 
that contribute to impact. However there are a different set of relevant tephra 
properties and vulnerability indicators with a recognised influence to different types of 










Table 3: Relevant tephra properties and vulnerability indicators. Each property has been assigned a 
unique letter or symbol: thickness, T; grainsize distribution Φ; airborne volcanic tephra concentration, 
C; particle density, ρ; presence, P; surface composition, SC; abrasiveness, A. The importance of each 
property in terms of its influence on impacts is indicated using an ‘X’ for a key property or an ‘o’ for 
possible influence. After Wilson et al (2015).   
Impact description  




T Φ C ρ P SC A 
Roof gutters and drains 
blocked 
X X     X 
Roof catchment 
area, pitch, gutter 
diameter and 
strength 
Hampton et al, 
2014 
Metal roof claddings 
corroded 
o X    X  
Metal type, coating 
and condition 
Johnston, 1997; 
Oze et al, 2014 
Building interiors 
contaminated  




quality and  entry 
protocol  
Wilson et al, 2011; 
Wilson et al, 2015 
Painted surfaces stained 
or leached 






HVAC systems: filters 
blocked, abrasion 
damage, decline  in 
functionality 
X X X o o X o 
Internal air flow 




Water tanks blocked or 
contaminated 
X     X  
Source of water, 
open air or covered   
Stewart et al, 




2.3.2 Ballistic impacts to buildings 
There have been relatively few quantitative studies investigating ballistic impacts to 
buildings and in contrast to tephra fall no ballistic-building fragility functions have been 
published to date. However some studies provide useful observations on ballistic 
damage to buildings (Table 4). Nearly all of the studies identified in this table provide 
a distance that ballistics have travelled from their source and state what type of 
damage occurred at that distance. Several of these studies provide further details such 
as measurements of the ballistic’s diameter or weight and stating what type of 
building(s) or building material(s) have been damaged. Nairn (1975) for example 
provides a detailed description of ballistic damage to Mt Ruapehu’s Glacial Hut which 
was apparently mostly caused by “one large block which formed a 2 m wide impact 
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crater near the hut, broke into pieces and bounced upward through the hut walls 
leaving holes up to 0.3 metres across”. These accounts provide useful insights into 
what damage has occurred in the past but they do not provide enough information 
about the hazard or the type of material impacted to quantify its vulnerability 
retrospectively. 
Table 4: A selection of observations on ballistic damage to buildings. 
Eruption Damage type Damage description Reference 
Soufriere, 
1902 
Light - no 
damage 
Bombs up to 900 grams dented galvanised iron roofs 









Ketetahi Hut perforated from roof to floor in several 
locations  













The Glacier Hut, 1200 m from Ruapehu's Crater Lake 
was hit 35 times with some block fragments burning 
holes in the floor 
Nairn, 1975 
Mt Usu, 2000 
>50 residential, commercial and municipal buildings 
damaged beyond repair by ballistic perforations up to 
600 metres from multiple vents 
Fitzgerald et al., 
in prep. 
Mt Ontake, 
1979 and 2014 
Timber roofed mountain lodges perforated by blocks 
up to 1 km from vent 
Maeda et al., 
2015; Fitzgerald 
et al., in prep. 
Stromboli, 
1912  Complete 
building 
collapse 
Ballistics weighing up to 30 tonnes destroyed several 




The timber framed lookout at Lassen Peak was 
destroyed by successive ballistic impacts 400 metres 






5 buildings burnt following perforation of sheet metal 
roofs by blocks up to 3.5 km from vent during rainfall, 
concrete roofs destroyed by 0.5 m diameter blocks 1 
km from vent 




Buildings from 4 separate villages ignited by bombs 
falling up to 6 km from vent 
Omori, 1916b 
Eldjfell, 1973 
Ignition following perforation of roofs and unprotected 
windows by bombs 
Booth, 1973 
Asama, 1783 
52 out of 162 houses completely burnt following 
perforation by red hot pumice blocks 11 km from vent 
Aramaki, 1957 
      
The first significant attempt to quantify building vulnerability to ballistic impacts comes 
from Blong (1981). In this pioneering study the author collated work from previous 
cyclone and impact engineering studies to calculate the minimum impact energies 
required to perforate a range of common building claddings with a cubical block 
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striking perpendicular to the plane of the cladding (Figure 10). More recent hurricane 
vulnerability studies investigating windborne debris impacts to buildings have come up 
with similar impact energy thresholds for the perforation of metal hurricane shutters, 
despite these tests using timber 2 × 4’s and roof tiles as their missiles instead of lithic 
blocks (Fernandez et al., 2010; Alphonso and Barbato, 2014).  
 
Figure 10: Minimum impact energies required for perforation of different roof cladding materials. After 
Blong (1981). Material types and thicknesses outlined in Table 5 below. Graph from Spence et al. 
(2011). 
Table 5: List of building materials tested. Note that the original Dp (timber boards) has been broken 
down into Dp1 and Dp2 (hardboard and plywood respectively). 
Building material  
Thickness 
(mm) 
Minimum perforation energy 
(J) 
Ap: Glass sheet 2.5 - 4 0.15 - 1.25 
Bp: Tile 10 - 40 10 – 90 
Cp: Fibre reinforced concrete sheet 4.5 - 9.5 20 -85 
Dp1: Hardboard 9.5 60 – 90 
Dp2: Plywood 4.5 - 12 90 – 500 
Ep: Steel Sheet 0.42 - 0.7 150 - 1000 
Fp: Reinforced concrete slab 50 - 125 4000 -11000 
 
Blong’s (1981) perforation threshold calculations have been used  in more recent 
publications (e.g. Blong, 1984; Jenkins and Spence, 2009; Jenkins et al., 2014) but 
they make no significant advancements on the initial study. Jenkins et al. (2014) 
referred to the work and stated that perforation may occur for impacts below the 
minimum value and that some roofs may remain intact following impacts above the 
maximum value but the ranges indicate where most of the damage may be expected 
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for a typical roofing stock. Jenkins and Spence (2009) note the calculations should be 
treated with caution as they rely on data collated from numerous studies which used 
different testing conditions and building materials. Other knowledge gaps surrounding 
this work include the effect of impact obliquity away from perpendicular, the effect of 
strikes to cladding which is directly supported by framing and the damage associated 
with impacts by partially molten, visco-elastic bombs compared to the relatively harder, 
denser blocks which are currently considered. These knowledge gaps are investigated 
using post-eruption ballistic impact assessments and ballistic cannon experiments 
(Chapter 3). 
2.3.2.1Important factors influencing ballistic impacts to buildings 
Assessing building vulnerability to ballistic hazards requires an initial identification of 
the factors which influence ballistic impacts to buildings. The development of fragility 
and vulnerability functions in particular requires the selection of an appropriate hazard 
intensity metric (HIM). The following flowchart identifies two possible HIM’s for ballistic 
fragility or vulnerability functions and important aspects of building exposure and 
vulnerability that influence the hazard’s overall damage to buildings (Figure 11). One 
way to quantify the total ballistic damage to a single building is to model the damage 
from each individual impact, then sum all of the impacts.  





Figure 11: Factors influencing ballistic impacts to buildings. Factors have been identified from review 
of literature (Chapter 2), post-eruption impact assessments and cannon experiments (Chapter 3). 
Boxes with colour gradients signify the outcome is controlled by a combination of hazard (red) and 
exposure (blue) factors. Two potential HIM’s have been identified. 
 
2.3.2.1.1 Damage from individual impacts 
The amount of damage caused by an individual ballistic impact increases significantly 
if the ballistic is able to perforate the building envelope (see Table 4). This is likely due 
to a perforating ballistic being able to continue on its trajectory to cause further damage 
inside the building and because any perforation created increases the building’s 
exposure to rain, wind and other volcanic hazards (Herbin and Barbato, 2012; 
Fitzgerald et al. in prep). In turn, the single most important factor influencing ballistic 
perforation potential is the ballistic’s impact energy (rather than the building’s 
construction materials). This is because most construction materials (other than RC) 
have perforation thresholds of less than 1000 joules. By comparison, the impact 
energy estimations for most ballistics (>20 cm diameter that attain terminal velocity 
whilst falling) are typically over an order of magnitude higher (Blong, 1981; Fitzgerald 
et al., 2014; Tsunematsu et al., 2014). However, as the ballistic models that calculate 
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impact energies have been calibrated predominantly using ballistic craters (e.g. 
Fitzgerald et al., 2014), the models may be biased towards high energy impacts that 
leave craters whilst neglecting to model smaller ballistics that do not. Video footage of 
the 2014 Mt Ontake eruption shows hundreds of relatively small (<10 cm in diameter) 
ballistic blocks impacting, bouncing and shattering on the ground but leaving no 
noticeable crater (NipponNewsNet, 2014). Ballistics of this size will have lower impact 
energies that may not be capable of perforating certain building claddings. Therefore 
at the lower range of ballistic impact energies, cladding strength becomes an important 
factor influencing overall building damage.     
Oblique WBD impact experiments conducted by McDonald (1990) and Masters et al.  
(2010) were less likely to cause perforation than perpendicular impacts of the same 
energy. Obliquity is calculated from the difference between a projectile’s trajectory and 
a line perpendicular to the face of target.  For ballistic impacts obliquity is a function of 
impact angle and the pitch of the cladding it is striking (Figure 12). The reduction in 
perforation probabilities associated with the full range of obliquities is a knowledge gap 
that must be quantified as a part of more accurate ballistic-building impact 
assessments (see section 3.3.2.2.1).   
 
Figure 12: A) Obliquities for ballistic strikes of the same, 70° impact angle but different cladding 
pitches and B) obliquities for a range of impact angles and cladding pitches. Note that for impacts to 
vertical walls, obliquity is equal to impact angle. 
Another factor to consider is the added perforation resistance buildings possess when 
impacts strike cladding at locations supported by framing. Impacts of this type will 
require higher impact energies to perforate the building envelope as ballistics must 
pass through additional layers of material which are potentially stronger than the 
cladding itself. The vulnerability of buildings to this type of impact has yet to be  
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incorporated into modelling to produce more accurate risk or impact assessments. 
Should framing be impacted and still fail to resist perforation, the ruptured framing 
member will contribute to additional total building damage and the structure is likely to 
have a lower load bearing capacity making the building more vulnerable to tephra fall 
loading. Additionally from studies of building vulnerability to hurricane hazards when 
a building envelope becomes perforated by windborne debris, the structure is 
subjected to a much higher risk of damage due to increased internal wind pressure 
(Herbin and Barbato, 2012). This same phenomena could be applicable to pyroclastic 
density currents acting on ballistic perforations but this is an aspect of multi-hazard 
impacts that has yet to be investigated.   
Another aspect of ballistic impacts to buildings that Blong’s (1984) thresholds do not 
consider are the differences between juvenile bombs and lithic blocks. The two types 
of ballistics have different properties influencing their potential impacts to buildings. 
Bombs ejected during Strombolian or Hawaiian style eruptions typically have slower 
ejection velocities than blocks ejected during more explosive eruptions (e.g. 25 – 65 
m/s mean ejection velocity of bombs from Yasur Volcano, Vanuatu  (Gaudin et al., 
2014) compared to 200 m/s modelled ejection velocity of blocks from Upper Te Maari 
(Fitzgerald et al., 2014)). Bombs experience fluidal deformation during flight and often 
form a distinctive, ‘cow patt’ shape on impact (Cas and Wright, 2012). Also hardness 
of projectiles has been found to have a measurable effect on their ability to perforate 
layers of metal, concrete and soil targets (Kar, 1979; Børvik et al., 2004) thus semi-
molten bombs which can deform on impact may be less likely to perforate building 
envelopes than harder, solid blocks.  Bombs typically also have lower densities than 
cooled, solidified blocks, further reducing their perforation capabilities (e.g. 1810 kg/m3 
average density of 53 bombs from Stromboli (Gurioli et al., 2013) compared to 2400 
and 2100kg/m3 for the two main block lithologies ejected in the 2014 Te Maari Eruption 
(Breard et al., 2014)). However, the high temperatures that incandescent bombs 
possess when they are ejected (ranging up to ~1100°C (Blong, 1981; Vanderkluysen 
et al., 2012)) mean that bombs have the potential (and have been observed) to trigger 
fires inside buildings, sometimes leading to their complete destruction (Booth, 1979; 
Wardman et al., 2012; Blake et al., 2015). Blocks on the other hand are much cooler 
and therefore less likely to start fires (Vanderkluysen et al., 2012)   
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High temperature, ballistics penetrating through roofs and windows caused fires inside 
buildings during the 1973 Eldjfell eruption.  Sheets of metal were fixed over the 
windows of walls facing towards the vent in attempt to reduce building damage (Booth, 
1979). Holes were burnt in the floor of Mt Ruapehu’s Glacier Hut by fragments of a 
ballistic which shattered directly in front of the hut during the 1975 eruption (Nairn, 
1975) and Blong (1984) stated that complete building destruction appears to occur 
more often from bombs starting fires rather than from repeated block impacts that do 
not start fires. Forest fires have also been initiated by ballistics on multiple occasions 
meaning ballistics do not necessarily need to directly impact buildings in order to start 
fires capable of destroying them (Zobin et al., 2002; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al., 
2012).  
If a ballistic does perforate the building envelope, making accurate damage estimates 
becomes more complicated as there are additional factors to consider besides impact 
energy, obliquity and the cladding’s impact resistance. New factors to consider 
include: the number of internal walls and floors that could be impacted; the contents 
value of the building; the likelihood that electrical, plumbing or gas lines may be 
destroyed or the likelihood that a hot ballistic could set fire to the house. Due to the 
complexities and unknowns involved in calculating ballistic damage caused to building 
interiors, estimates will rely heavily on assumptions.  
A final factor to consider during damage estimates is the time taken to repair a building. 
When a perforation is made in the building envelope the building may start to take on 
damage from accelerated water (Herbin and Barbato, 2012) and ash infiltration, 
especially when the perforation is to the roof.  
2.3.2.1.2 Impacts per building footprint area 
Once a method for estimating the damage from individual impacts has been 
established, the total damage can be estimated from the sum of these impacts relative 
to the size of the building. Buildings can absorb a relatively high density of impacts 
without completely collapsing (Figure 13), but based on repair costs there is likely to 
be a threshold beyond which repair becomes uneconomical regardless of whether the 
building has fully collapsed or not. Unless multiple impacts are close together (<1 m 





Figure 13: High ballistic impact densities to a timber clad apartment block ~600 m from one of the 
vents formed during the 2000 eruption of Mt Usu. Photo credit to Professor Hiromu Okada. 
 
2.4 Previously developed tephra-building fragility and 
vulnerability functions 
This section compares the currently available group of tephra-building fragility and 
vulnerability functions and the impacts they model against the range of possible tephra 
impacts identified in the previous section (Section 2.3.). This forms a gap analysis 
which can be used to direct the future development of functions. For ballistic impacts 
to buildings there are currently no published fragility functions. For tephra fall impacts 
to buildings, functions focus on a limited range of impacts to a building types which 
are specific to Neapolitan building types (Pomonis et al., 1999; Zuccaro et al., 2008; 
Jenkins and Spence, 2009; Jenkins et al., 2014) which reduces their relevance to New 
Zealand building stocks and their applicability to AVF risk assessments.  
All the studies that have produced tephra-building fragility or vulnerability functions to 
date have followed methods which require the use of analytical, experimental or expert 
judgement elicitation data (Table 6). Post-eruption impact assessments do not usually 
the specific aim to develop fragility functions as this requires a large number of 
restrictive requirements to be met. Firstly, a population of buildings (ideally >30 
(Rossetto et al., 2014)) of a particular building typology must be impacted so that 
39 
 
different buildings of the same typology provide examples of the range of potential 
damage that can occur under varying hazard intensities. This situation is relatively 
unlikely to occur meaning if fragility functions are to be derived from impact 
assessments, the data gained across multiple campaigns needs to be recorded in 
such a way that it can be easily combined and ‘harmonised’ (Rossetto et al., 2014). 
Blong’s (2003) survey of 173 buildings impacted by the 1994 eruptions of Mt Tavurvur 
and Mt Vulcan in Rabaul, Papua New Guinea represents the closest attempt to 
produce fragility or vulnerability functions using a post eruption impact assessment. 
The study plotted tephra loading against damage indices (using a five point damage 
scale from zero representing no damage through to five for collapse beyond economic 
repair) for 98 timber framed buildings with metal deck roofs (Figure 14). The author 
has not fit a curve to the data, perhaps due to a lack of impacted buildings, especially 
for the three lowest damage indices with <15 buildings each.    
 
Figure 14: Damage indices plotted against tephra loads for 98 timber framed buildings surveyed in 
Rabaul, 1994. C, H and I stand for commercial, residential (houses) and industrial buildings 





Table 6: Studies and reports that have produced fragility or vulnerability functions using analytical, 
experimental or expert elicitation data 
Study area Data source 
Number of 
functions 






All building types recognised in 
the GAR 15 "Global Building 
Schema" 







5 major residential roof types and 
long-span non-residential roofs 







Weak (Old sheet roof), Medium 
weak, Medium Strong  and Strong 
(Reinforced concrete) 








Timber framed buildings of three 
types based on member 
dimensions and spacing 
(Pomonis et al., 1999) 
 
 
Roof collapse thresholds are the focus of the studies in Table 6. This is likely to have 
been driven by concerns for the life safety of building occupants during eruptions 
(Wilson, 2015). Three of the five  functions have been developed for European 
(specifically Neapolitan) building types, reflecting their origin from the EXPLORIS and 
MIA-VITA projects which aimed to provide better risk assessment and mitigation to 
populations surrounding several European volcanoes(Spence et al., 2005b; Zuccaro 
et al., 2008; Jenkins and Spence, 2009).  
In the United Nations Global Assessment of Risk report 2015 (GAR15), Maqsood et 
al. (2015) produced vulnerability functions for tephra impacts to a wider range of 
building types within a global building schema. The vulnerability functions they 
produced relate a roof’s superimposed tephra load to an expected, mean damage 
ratio. Their damage ratio falls between 0 and 1 for the total cost to repair building 
damage divided by the total cost of the building’s replacement. This work resulted in 
the development of vulnerability curves for 31 different building types. With the wider 
range of building types considered by this report, several types can be considered 
more applicable to Auckland’s buildings than those developed in the previously 
mentioned, European vulnerability studies. 
For ballistics, there are currently no functions of either type available to date. There is 
less information for ballistic impacts to buildings than there is for tephra fall for a 
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number of possible reasons. Perhaps the most important being that tephra fall is a 
more widespread hazard than ballistics meaning far fewer buildings have been 
impacted by ballistics. This results in having fewer buildings to survey for vulnerability 
assessments and ballistic impacts being perceived as less important to study than 
tephra fall impacts. A further deterrent to researchers developing ballistic fragility 
function is that the HIMs used for ballistics (impact energy and density for example) 
are more complicated to measure than the main HIM used for tephra fall functions, 
which is loading (kPa). The variables required to calculate tephra loading are tephra 
thickness and density. These variables are more rapidly calculated during a post 
eruption survey than the variables required to calculate a ballistic’s impact energy. 
This requires measurement of a ballistic’s mass and impact velocity. For these 
measurements to be taken and then correlated with damage, the individual ballistic 
that has caused building damage first needs to be located. This in itself can prove 
challenging as ballistics striking with high impact energies are prone to burial, 
shattering or bouncing. If a ballistic is located and linked back to the damage it caused, 
the next step is to calculate the block’s final velocity which requires modelling of its 
trajectory. These unavoidable complexities associated with measuring ballistic impact 
energies in the field support the notion that empirical vulnerability data for ballistic-
building impacts is more easily obtained through controlled laboratory experiments. 
However, before conducting laboratory experiments, it is worth noting that it is possible 
to develop new fragility functions from the review of previous ballistic-building 
vulnerability studies (see section 2.5.).Few accounts of ballistic impacts to buildings 
provide sufficient detail to measure hazard intensity or identify what specific types of 
building or cladding have been impacted (Table 4). For this reason the perforation 
thresholds from Blong (1981) represent the most complete source of data for ballistic-
building impacts that could be used to derive fragility functions. Jenkins and Spence 
(2009) stated that due to limited available data they were unable to derive fragility 
functions for ballistic impacts and instead suggested applying binary cladding failure 




2.5 Developing new ballistic-building fragility functions from 
review of literature 
A more sophisticated approach to derive ballistic perforation fragility functions from a 
dataset with only two end points, is to find the two impact energies (constants on the 
HIM, x-axis) where the probability of perforation transitions from 0% to < 0% and from 
> 100% to 100%. This locates the maximum and minimum perforation thresholds from 
Blong (1981)’s study. If we assume the mid-point between the maximum and the 
minimum has a 50% chance of perforation, this allows a third point to be plotted onto 
the graph. Fitting a curve to these three points with a cumulative distribution gives a 
fragility function with a typical sigmoidal shape often used in seismic fragility functions 
(Baker, 2014)(Figure 15). The resulting fragility function implies that there is a 0% 
chance of a cladding being perforated by a ballistic whose impact energy is below the 
minimum energy required for perforation as stated in Blong (1981). It also implies that 
there is a 100% chance of perforation for any impact over the maximum perforation 
threshold value.   
 
Figure 15: Perforation fragility functions for ballistic blocks striking perpendicular to the plane of 
various roof claddings. Refer to Table 7 for cladding types and function values.   
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The ballistic perforation fragility curves are defined using a lognormal cumulative 
distribution function, which is commonly applied in seismic building fragility studies 
(Baker, 2014): 







Where the probability of a roof cladding material being perforated (𝑝) is dependent on 
a ballistic’s impact energy (IM) which is measured in 𝑥 joules, Φ is the standard log 
normal cumulative distribution function (CDF), 𝜃 is the median of the fragility function 
(the IM level with 50% probability of perforation) and 𝛽 is the standard deviation of 
lnIM. The functions in Figure 15 can be reproduced using the 𝜃 and 𝛽 values listed in 
Table 7. 
Building material  Median (θ)  Standard deviation (β)  
Ab: Glass sheet 0.75 0.25 
Bb: Tile 50 0.3 
Cb: Fibre reinforced concrete sheet 55 0.2 
Db1: Hardboard 75 0.078 
Db2: Plywood 295 0.35 
Eb: Steel Sheet 550 0.25 
Fb: Reinforced concrete slab 7500 0.2 
Table 7: A list of the median and standard deviation parameters for reproducing fragility functions.   
 
2.5.1 Documentation of limitations and applicability  
These functions have been derived using simplistic function fitting techniques on a 
limited dataset from Blong (1981) which in turn gathered its data by collating work from 
a range of cyclone engineering studies, each using different testing procedures and 
materials built to different building codes. Furthermore, the perforation impact energy 
thresholds given by Blong come predominantly from cyclone vulnerability experiments 
which used roof tiles, steel pipes and wooden 2x4’s as their missiles. Ballistic blocks 
have different properties than these missiles and would perhaps produce different 
perforation thresholds.  
For these reasons it is important to apply confidence intervals to these functions to 
account for their considerable uncertainty. Jenkins and Spence (2009) suggest 
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applying uncertainty bounds of ± 20% of the ballistics impact energy. The methodology 
used to derive these functions is simplistic but in the absence of more detailed, 
quantitative data, this method has been adopted to derive, the first (known) ballistic-
building fragility functions. It is important to validate these curves using empirical data, 
either from laboratory experiments or post-eruption impact assessments (Chapter 3).  
 
2.6 Summary and research gaps 
A critical aspect of volcanic risk assessment is the quantification of probable impacts 
to society. Despite the large costs associated with building repairs during the recovery 
phase of eruptions and potential for loss of life from tephra induced roof collapse or 
ballistic impacts there is limited, useful quantitative vulnerability research on the 
impacts of tephra hazards to buildings. The framework presented in this chapter has 
provided a systematic approach for the development of new tephra-building fragility 
functions so that the vulnerability component of risk and impact assessments may be 
enhanced.  
From the reviews in this chapter, suitable HIMs and building vulnerability indicators 
have been identified for both tephra fall and ballistic impacts to buildings. The reviews 
have also been used to develop new ballistic fragility functions and identify tephra fall 
vulnerability functions that could be used to assess Auckland’s tephra risk. However, 
several questions that require further investigation include: 
 How vulnerable are non-structural building components to impacts from light 
tephra fall hazards? 
 How vulnerable are buildings to impacts from ballistic hazards? (Chapter 3)  
 How do ballistic hazards interact with or potentially exacerbated the damage to 
buildings caused by tephra fall and other volcanic hazards? (Section 4.5)  
The following chapter investigates building vulnerability to ballistic hazards presenting 
insights gained from two post-eruption tephra-building impact assessment trips and 
incorporates the knowledge gained into the development of new ballistic fragility 
functions derived using ballistic cannon experiments. Chapter 5 then provides an 




Chapter 3 Ballistic Cannon Experimentation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Although ample anecdotal evidence from past eruptions and a group of impact 
engineering studies provide some understanding of building vulnerability to ballistic 
impacts, a systematic examination has not been conducted to date. This chapter 
presents results from ballistic impact experiments to three building claddings 
commonly used in New Zealand construction (sheet metal, weatherboards and 
reinforced concrete slabs). A suite of fragility functions has been derived for each 
cladding to determine the relationship between ballistic hazard intensity and the 
probability of a given level of damage occurring. The experimental design has been 
informed by building surveys conducted during two recent post-eruption ballistic 
impact assessment trips to Mt Usu and Mt Ontake, Japan. This chapter contributes to 
one of the key thesis objectives to quantify building vulnerability to ballistic hazards 
and it addresses the risk analysis stage of the risk management framework.    
The chapter first presents the findings of the impact assessment trips. The trips 
identified new factors that influence building damage severity (in addition to those 
identified in Chapter 2) and common damage mechanisms for different building 
claddings. Data from the impact assessment trips was used to develop its own suite 
of fragility functions and to inform the experimental design of ballistic cannon testing 
(outlined in section 3.3.2). In addition to the development of fragility functions, 
experiments have also provided information on the velocity of concrete fragments 
ejected during impact with implications for occupant life safety.      
3.2 Post-eruption ballistic-building impact assessment  
Post-eruption impact assessments are a source of empirical data on the impacts of 
volcanic hazards to society (Wilson et al., in review). The focus of previous tephra 
impact assessment trips has been to gain an understanding of tephra fall impacts to 
individual system components and the more complex impacts associated with overall 
system functionality and system interdependencies (Wilson et al., 2012). The two 
impact assessment trips described below were taken by our research group with one 
of the specific objectives being to collect data for the development of ballistic-building 
fragility functions. Data was collected using building surveys on a small number of 
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buildings impacted by ballistics and tephra fall.  Aside from the surveys providing 
quantitative, empirical damage data they also allowed us to gain qualitative insights of 
the typical damage patterns that occur when ballistics and tephra fall impact buildings. 
Qualitative insights such as these can be used to inform assumptions made during 
impact assessment modelling and they can be used to identify which buildings and 
even the areas within them, are most suitable for sheltering in during an eruption. 
3.2.1 Ballistic-building impact assessment for the 2000 eruption of Mount Usu 
In July 2015, a group of eight buildings impacted by ballistics during the 2000 eruption 
of Mt Usu were surveyed to assess the vulnerability of two separate building types to 
ballistic damage. Building damage from ballistics in this eruption was primarily 
controlled by building proximity to vent rather than building cladding type. This 
suggests impact density (impacts per unit area) may be a more appropriate HIM than 
impact energy. However, there was one area where the importance of cladding type 
was illustrated by two reinforced concrete buildings which sustained far less ballistic 
damage than two adjacent timber and metal clad buildings despite all four being 
relatively close together and subjected to similar impact densities (Figure 20).  
It’s important to note that ballistics were not the most destructive hazard for four of the 
eight buildings surveyed. Two buildings were damaged by severe ground deformation 
making it difficult to determine how much damage was caused by ballistics and a 
further two buildings were impacted on their ground floors by a mudflow, leaving 
ballistic impacts to the roofs and walls still preserved.   
From observations and measurements taken in the field previous ballistic hazard 
studies have shown it is possible to model individual ballistic trajectories and estimate 
their impact energy (Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al., 2012; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al., 
2016). In these surveys impact energy is then compared to the damage caused so 
that data can be plotted onto existing ballistic fragility functions to test their accuracy 
or it can be used to develop new functions. Qualitative insights into building damage 
were also obtained during these surveys. The diameter of perforations in metal roof 
cladding were found to be roughly equal to the diameter of the ballistic causing them. 
The same is true for the exterior face of concrete slabs. The backface of concrete 
slabs however displayed a typical high-velocity impact response of back-face scabbing 
(shattering with fragments being propelled into the building) (Beppu et al., 2008; Peng 
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et al., 2015). Further insights included the observation that for buildings with pitched 
roofs, the sides sloping away from the vent received notably less damage and the 
same was observed for walls facing away from the vent. This suggests that if people 
were to be caught inside a building during an eruption the safest place to shelter would 
be on the end of the building on the farthest side from the erupting vent and under any 
available robust furniture or bed mattresses. This protective action places as many 
layers of the building envelope as possible, in between a person and the erupting vent.       
3.2.1.1Summary of the 2000 eruption of Mount Usu 
Mount Usu, located in southern Hokkaido, is one of the most active volcanoes in Japan 
having had nine major eruptions since 1663 (Takarada, 2003). The most recent 
eruption began on 31 March 2000 following four days of precursory seismicity and 
ground deformation. Similar eruption precursors had occurred in the three most recent 
eruptions, allowing scientists to alert local governments on 29 March and make the 
first successful prediction of a volcanic eruption in Japan. An evacuation of over 
10,000 local residents was completed the day before the eruption (Takarada, 2003). 
As a result of the evacuations, no lives were lost in the eruption. However, the close 
proximity of the Toyako Township to the vents resulted in extensive building damage. 
Over 50 new craters opened up during the eruption in two distinct areas. The largest 
eruptions occurred from first craters which opened up on the western flank of Mt Usu 
on 31 March (Takarada et al., 2002). Volcanic plumes reached 500 m a.s.l. before 
collapsing to form base surges along Highway 230. Relatively small amounts of tephra 
were deposited to the northeast with 100 cm being deposited 90 metres from the vent 
thinning to 2.5 cm at 1 km from the vent.  The first ballistic blocks were ejected in the 
opposite direction to tephra falls in a west- northwest directed swath. The ballistic field 
extended just over 1 km from the initial vents, with blocks up to 65 cm in diameter 
landing beyond the highway to the neighbouring Date city (Takarada and Hasaka, 
2000). New eruption craters formed with a NW trend towards the main Toyako 
Township and damage by ballistic blocks continued until June 2000. Despite a large 
number of buildings being impacted by ash and ballistics, ground deformation and hot 
mudflows were responsible for the most severe damage in this eruption.  
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3.2.1.2Building damage surveys  
Eight buildings impacted by ballistic blocks during the 2000 eruption that have been 
preserved within the Usu Caldera Geo-Park were surveyed. Three of these buildings 
were made of reinforced concrete and five were timber framed buildings with a sheet 
metal roofs and fibre reinforced concrete sheet wall cladding. During surveys, data on 
these two groups of buildings and their performance under varying ballistic impact 
intensities was obtained. Ballistic hazard data collected in the field (including: block 
size and weight, distance travelled, impact angle etc.) allows for the trajectory of 
individual ballistics to be modelled so that their impact energy can be estimated and 
compared to the building damage caused. Although damage data was gathered for 
both of these groups of buildings there was only a sufficient number of impacts 
recorded to develop fragility functions for the metal roof clad, timber framed buildings. 
However, in addition to fragility function development, important qualitative insights 
into building vulnerability and sheltering capacity have also been made.  
3.2.1.2.1Damage surveys on timber framed buildings with sheet metal roofing  
Ballistic damage caused to timber framed buildings with sheet metal roofing was of 
particular interest during this study as this is the most common building typology for 
Auckland’s residential buildings (Magill et al., 2006a). This building typology was found 
to be significantly more vulnerable than buildings with reinforced concrete slab roofing. 
Across the surveys we observed several damage patterns with important implications 
for building vulnerability and ballistic hazards. 
The main type of ballistics observed in these surveys were relatively high density 
andesite blocks and although there were no ballistic bombs of unsolidifed magma 
ejected during this eruption, there were several buildings impacted by ‘mudbombs’. 
Mudbombs had a lower density than the blocks but could still cause considerable 
damage to buildings (Figure 17B).   
Buildings were found to preserve important information that can be used during 
ballistic hazard mapping such as impact angles, impact densities and size 
distributions. Information on the diameter of ballistics was recorded by roof perforation 
diameter as these were found to have very similar size and shape to the ballistics that 




Figure 16: Building damage illustrating the relationship between block diameter and perforation 
diameter for metal roof cladding. 
Impact angles can also be measured in cases where multiple layers of the building 
envelope are perforated. The trajectory taken between successive perforations gives 
the impact angle of the block that caused damage. This technique was used during 
surveys to identify which vent from a group of possible candidates produced the 
damage causing ballistics for particular buildings (Figure 17).  
      
Figure 17: Building damage illustrating how buildings preserve impact trajectories of ballistics. A) 
Trajectory measured from alignment of perforations, scratches or mud streaks (red lines) and 
measuring the impact angle. This technique was used to identify the single vent which ejected 
ballistics causing this damage from a group of four possible candidates. B) Mudbomb impact with 
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fragments of timber framing embedded in the wall (orange circle). Photo credit to Professor Hiromu 
Okada.   
All buildings surveyed showed a pattern of having received significantly less damage 
on the walls and roof slopes facing away from the erupting vent (Figure 18). The walls 
furthest from the erupting vent have at least one additional layer of the building 
envelope to reduce a ballistic’s speed and impact energy. There’s also the possibility 
that a ballistic will shatter into smaller fragments during its impact to the first layer of 
the envelope. This produced a shadowing effect with reduced damage to the walls 
furthest from the erupting vent. Roofs sloping away from the vent also received less 
damage (Figure 18C & 3D), not due to shadowing but more likely due to the increased 
impact obliquity as the slope of the roof was more closely aligned to the trajectory of 
incoming ballistics. The influence of impact obliquity on perforation potential is 
especially important considering that if a high obliquity impact does result in 
perforation, the ballistic takes a longer trajectory through the wall potentially causing 








Figure 18: Two buildings which illustrate reduced damage to walls and roofs facing away from the 
vent. A) The west facing wall of Toyako Kindergarten which received significantly less damage than 
B) the east facing wall closest to its erupting vent. C) The north facing slope of a metal roof in 
Kompiriyama which received three minor dents compared to the south slope D) which received one 
perforation and several large dents. 
 
 
Figure 19: An illustration of the effect of impact obliquity on building damage from a ballistic impact 
(trajectory in red) from the 2000 eruption of Mt Usu. A) Moderate roof damage from a low obliquity 
ballistic perforation (orange) transitioning into B) a high obliquity impact causing relatively severe 
damage to the wall (blue). Photo credit to Professor Hiromu Okada.  
 
3.2.1.2.2Damage surveys on buildings with reinforced concrete roofs  
Buildings with reinforced concrete made up three of the eight damage surveys. 
Reinforced concrete clearly offered buildings higher ballistic impact resistances than 




(Figure 20). The large variability of slab thickness, concrete composition and spacing 
of reinforcement across the three buildings surveyed made it impractical to produce a 
single suite of fragility functions. Despite this lack of quantitative vulnerability 
information, qualitative insights have still been made with implications for life safety 
and building repair costs.  
In all three buildings there was evidence of back-face scabbing (Stephenson et al., 
1978) where ballistic impacts had shattered the concrete and sent fragments flying 
into buildings. The impact sites had large masses of concrete sheared out in a conical 
shear shape typical of projectile impacts (Yankelevsky, 1997). Scabbing had ejected 
fragments over a wide area increasing damage to the building interior and increasing 
the potentially lethal zone had anyone been sheltering inside the building.  
 
 
Figure 20: Performance of different roof claddings in impacted by predominantly by ‘mudbombs’ in 
Toyako. Timber cladding performed the worst (orange) followed by metal (blue) and concrete (black). 
Two perforations to the concrete apartment examined during surveys are circled. Photo credit to 
Professor Hiromu Okada.   
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The presence and spacing of reinforcing bars was found to strongly influence the sizes 
of ballistics that could perforate into a building and contradicted the assumption that 
larger blocks were more likely to perforate the building envelope (Figure 21). It was 
found that if a ballistic was too large to fit between reinforcement bars then it was less 
likely to perforate the concrete. At the Yasuragi No Le municipal bathhouse, the largest 
ballistic to impact did not perforate the building despite having an impact energy an 
order of magnitude higher than the threshold for ballistic perforation suggested by 
Blong (1981) . Instead the ballistic was suspended by the reinforcement bars, spaced 
20 cm apart so that the ~60×40 cm sized block could not pass between them (Figure 
21B). This phenomenon reduces the probability of a large ballistic puncturing 
successive layers of reinforced concrete however there is still potential for the 
increased volume of shrapnel produced by large blocks to cause significant building 
damage. 
 
Figure 21: Illustration of ballistic impacts from the 2000 eruption of Mt Usu causing concrete slab 
perforation without complete ballistic perforation due to reinforcing bars. A) Impact at Toyako 
Kindergarten, ~600 m from vent, 15 cm spacing between bars. B) Impact to Toyako’s municipal 
bathhouse ~550 m from vent, 20 cm spacing between bars.  
The surveys of concrete buildings also found evidence of increased ash ingress 
through ballistic perforations. At the Sakuragaoka apartment complex, ballistic impacts 
caused perforations to the concrete roof above two rooms on the top floor of the 
building.  An estimated 20 mm of tephra fell in this area during the 2000 eruption 
(Takarada, 2003), yet now there is a 30 cm thick deposit of wet tephra inside unit 505, 
in which a tree has grown over the past 15 years. The ash layer is thickest in the room 
where its ceiling was perforated by two impacts, it then thins to around 10 cm thick in 
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the adjacent room with no significant volumes of ash being found beyond the entrance 
to unit 505.  
   
3.2.2 Ballistic-building impact assessment for the 2014 eruption of Mount 
Ontake 
The sudden phreatic eruption at the summit of Mt Ontake in 2014 took 63 lives (Murase 
et al., 2016). At the time of our visit there were still 6 people missing and we were 
unable to conduct an impact assessment near the summit. Instead we gathered data 
from semi-structured interviews with local scientists from Nagoya University and from 
video footage and photos taken before, during and after the eruption. In the last 40 
years Mt Ontake has had four phreatic eruptions (Maeda et al., 2015), two of which 
have resulted in building damage caused by ballistics . Video footage taken during the 
eruption suggests that many of the ballistic blocks impacting near the summit were 
relatively small (<10 cm in diameter) and that relatively few of the ballistics impacting 
buildings were able to perforate the building envelope (NipponNewsNet, 2014). The 
fact that none of the people sheltered inside buildings were killed and at least one 
hiker was able to successfully avoid injury by holding their pack over their head 
suggests buildings can offer effective shelter from some ballistic impacts and that 
building occupants should seek to put as many layers of the building envelope or 
furniture and bags etc. in-between themselves and incoming ballistics in order to 
increase their safety.  
3.2.2.1 Impacts to mountain huts 
The mountain lodge area is has eight timber structures with metal clad roofs, roughly 
600 metres from the vent. Their roof cladding is weighted with boulders 30-40 cm in 
diameter to prevent roof detachment in high winds. During the eruption, the structures 
were impacted by surge, tephra fall and ballistics. Damage from tephra fall appears to 
be limited to contamination with  loads not being high enough to cause structural 
damage. Ballistic damage included perforations through roofs, walls and floors. 
Tephra fall and ballistics appear to have influenced each other’s impacts (Figure 22B). 
Ballistic perforations have become points for increased tephra contamination into 
buildings and tephra deposits in conjunction with the boulders placed on the roofs prior 
to the eruption appear to have provided an armouring effect to buildings, increasing 
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their resistance to ballistic damage. The armouring effect is inferred from ballistics ~15 
cm diameter, being unable to perforate the timber roof cladding and instead being 
resisted to form small impact craters in the tephra. Ballistics of this size, impacting 600 
metres from their vent possess impact energies in excess of 4000 joules, about four 
times higher than the energy sheet metal cladding is capable of resisting (Blong, 1981; 
Herbin and Barbato, 2012).      
 
Figure 22: Mountain huts near the peak of Mt Ontake. Buildings outlined for comparison (red and 
orange). A) 30-40 cm diameter boulders visible on roofs before the eruption. B) Huts with ballistic 
perforations covered in tephra fall. Some small ballistics have remained near their impact craters in 
the tephra (blue circles). Photo A) from, Wikimedia Commons (Alpsdake, 2014) and photo B) from 
Kyodo News (Wang, 2014). 
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Despite individual ballistics perforating entirely through buildings in places, no deaths 
occurred inside buildings (Fitzgerald et al. in prep). From Figure 22B and video footage 
from inside the hut during the eruption, it is clear that a large number of ballistics 
impacted the huts, yet the relatively low number of perforations suggests the majority 
of these impacts did not cause perforation (NipponNewsNet, 2014). These impacts 
are likely to have been from small ballistics whose mass (and therefore impact energy) 
was too low to perforate the building envelope, allowing the huts to successfully shelter 
their occupants. Ballistic cannon experiments have been conducted to quantify the 
impact resistance of cladding materials to relatively low energy ballistic impacts such 
as these (section 3.3).   
 
3.2.3 Fragility functions for timber framed buildings with sheet metal roofing  
The following fragility functions provide the conditional probability of a specific level of 
damage being caused to a sheet metal roof depending on the impact energy of a 
ballistic. A ballistic’s impact energy is defined as its kinetic energy at the moment it 
impacts. Therefore impact energy can be calculated using the equation for kinetic 
energy.  
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 =  
1
2
 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 × 𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 2 
Where impact energy is measured in joules, mass is measured in kilograms and 
velocity in metres per second. Accurate impact energy calculations are difficult to 
make from surveys as the mass and velocity of individual ballistic impacts is not able 
to be directly measured in the field and therefore requires modelling. In rare cases 
where ballistics have been recovered and matched to their impact point, their mass 
can be measured. When ballistics that have caused damage cannot be recovered, 
mass calculations first require their mass be estimated based on their size (from 
perforation/dent diameter) and the assumption that their density is similar to that of 
other ballistics found in the vicinity. Calculating the final velocity of a ballistic at the 
moment it strikes a building requires modelling and further assumptions. Modelling 
was completed using the “Eject!” ballistic model (Mastin, 2001) which requires 11 input 
parameters to output a ballistic trajectory with horizontal travel distance and final 
velocity calculated. Values for several input parameters could not be measured using 
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building surveys alone meaning assumptions have been used to assign values where 
necessary (Table 8). Assumptions are a significant source of uncertainty to any 
resulting impact energy estimates and this must be acknowledged with the use of 
uncertainty bounds on fragility functions. Once the first ten input parameters have 
been assigned a value, the last parameter (initial velocity of ejection) is adjusted until 
the block’s horizontal travel distance matches the map distance the block must have 
travelled between the block’s vent and the point where it impacted. A similar method 
for estimating ejection velocity based on field mapping of ballistics has been used in 
other studies (Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al., 2012; Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al., 
2016). Once the ballistic’s trajectory has been modelled, the final velocity associated 
with this trajectory is used in the above equation to calculate impact energy.        
Table 8: Eject! input parameters that required assumptions to allow parameterisation. 
Input 
parameter 
Assumed value Assumption rationale 
Block diameter Equal to diameter of 
cladding perforate/area 
damaged 
Relationship observed during surveys  
Block shape Cubes (blocks) or spheres 
(mud balls) 
Angular blocks of country rock observed 
during surveys of six buildings. Two 
buildings were predominantly impacted by 
well-rounded pyroclastic “mud balls”  
Block density 2200 kg/m3 blocks or 1800 
kg/m3 mud balls 
Typical andesite lava density (Breard et al., 
2014) with lower density for “mud balls” 
Drag coefficient 1.0 Consistent with experimental and numerical 
studies (Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia and 
Delgado-Granados, 2006; De’Michieli Vitturi 
et al., 2010) 
Ejection angle Less than or equal to the 
impact angles measured 
during surveys 
Ballistics follow near parabolic trajectories 
where it is possible for the impact angle to 
be higher than the ejection angle (due to air 
drag) but it is very unlikely that the ejection 
angle be higher than the impact angle 
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Once impact energies have been calculated, they are compared to their damage 
caused. The damages caused by individual ballistic impacts were categorised into one 
of four damage states (DS). The damage state descriptions are based on sheet metal 
failure mechanisms of increasing severity commonly observed during surveys Table 
9. 
Table 9: Damage state descriptions for ballistic impacts to buildings with sheet metal cladding.  
Sheet metal cladding 
Damage state Damage description 
DS 0 
Cosmetic damage: scratches as evidence of 
impact  
DS 1 Cosmetic damage: denting 
DS 2 Moderate damage: tearing  
DS 3 Severe damage: ballistic perforation 
  
Impact energies were calculated for a total of 26 individual ballistic impacts to buildings 
with sheet metal roofing. Due to a limited data set, fragility functions have been 
produced using the simplistic binning methodology outlined in Porter (2007). The data 
on impact energies and their associated damage states is summarised into a fragility 
function bin plot (Figure 23). Damage data has been ordered by increasing impact 
energy and grouped into three bins so that each contains a similar number of data 
points. The probability of a given damage state being reached or exceeded is 
calculated for each bin by counting the number of data that are equal to or greater 
than the damage state of interest (see Table 10 for an example). The probability is 
applied to the median value in the bin range. Using three bins provides fragility 










Table 10: Calculations for damage state exceedance probabilities for the 500 – 1500 joule impact 
energy bin.     
Impact energy (j) Damage state (DS) Exceedance probability 
calculation 
504 1 (denting) 





566 2 (tearing) 






𝑃(𝑑𝑠 ≥ 2) =
6
8
=  .75 
1347 2 
1347 2 




566 3 (perforation) 
    
 






































Figure 24: Fragility functions produced using damage data presented in Figure 23. 
Despite these fragility functions having large uncertainties they can still be used to 
quantify building vulnerability to ballistic hazards. Perforation can occur at any impact 
energy higher than 500 joules and in this survey all ballistics of >10 cm in diameter 
exceeded this meaning all but the smallest ballistic particles are capable of puncturing 
metal roofs. With this in mind some of the impacts >1000 J did not cause perforation 
meaning the sheet metal may have a higher impact resistance than previous research 
suggests (e.g. Blong, 1981; Alphonso and Barbato, 2014). In these surveys 5 impacts 
with energies estimated at over 1400 joules resulted in DS 2 tearing without DS 3 
perforation. This response is attributed to variable impact obliquities and the additional 
resistance offered by timber framing beneath certain sections of cladding. Research 
into the vulnerability of sheet metal roofs with timber framing is important as this roof 
typology is the most common within the Auckland building stock. 
3.2.3.1 Limitations of fragility functions derived from impact assessments      
The biggest limitation of these fragility functions is that they have been derived from a 
small dataset of 26 impacts to a population of five buildings with impact energy 
calculations relying on numerous assumptions. As a comparison with seismic fragility 
functions, Rossetto et al (2014) suggest function derivation requires a minimum of 30 
buildings of a given class and recommends >100 buildings. 
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Although impact obliquity is known to have an effect on target damage (Johnson et 
al., 1982; Chen et al., 2006), the obliquity of each impact is not possible to measure 
during surveys and thus damage from impacts of varying obliquities have been 
aggregated into one suite of fragility functions. During these relatively rapid surveys 
there is also likely to be a bias towards perforations being recorded compared to less 
severe DS 1 and DS 0 impacts which are more difficult to notice.  
Another limitation of these damage state functions is that they provide predictions of 
when very specific types of damage may occur to cladding. They do not give a wider 
indication of the overall impact to the building, i.e. on whether or not it may be habitable 
or structurally sound. Fragility functions also do not provide an indication of the likely 
cost to repair damage. These are important areas of future research for ballistic 
impacts to buildings. To overcome issues associated with impact energy and obliquity 
calculations from post-eruption building surveys, fragility functions can be developed 
from experimental studies.   
 
3.3 Ballistic cannon experiments 
3.3.1 Previous experimental studies 
This study builds on the preliminary research of Blong (1981) and the functions 
produced from experimental data may be used to assess the accuracy of Blong’s 
perforation threshold estimates. More recent experimental studies from the fields of 
impact engineering and hurricane-building vulnerability have informed the 
experimental design and parameters (e.g. McDonald, 1990; Fernandez et al., 2010; 
Masters et al., 2010; Alphonso and Barbato, 2014; Chen and Hao, 2015). 
Windborne debris (WBD) impacts to metal hurricane shutters have been 
experimentally investigated by Fernandez et al. (2010) and Alphonso and Barbato 
(2014). Alphonso and Barbato (2014) conducted 48 impact tests using 2 × 4  lumber 
missiles to produce fragility functions defining the relationship between kinetic energy 
and the probability of shutter failure. Their preliminary experiments found that a 
missile’s kinetic energy is a suitable hazard intensity measure to use in functions. 
Kinetic energy correlated more strongly with observed damage than other possible 
HIM’s such as missile velocity or missile length. The maximum threshold that shutters 
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were found to be capable of resisting puncture was 1150 joules. Fernandez et al. 
(2010) completed a similar study investigating tile impacts to metal shutters. They 
conducted 180 tile impact tests and 60 2 × 4  tests using lumber missiles of the same 
weight and velocity to compare performance as a function of debris type. The shutters 
performed to their certification standard under normal 2 × 4 tests with 4.1 kg (9 lb) 
missiles launched at 15.25 m/s (50 fps) but the equivalent kinetic energy for the tile 
tests produced significantly more total shutter deformation. Fernandez et al. (2010) 
also investigated the effect of tile’s impact orientation. Tiles were launched to produce 
both edge and flat impacts and in all but three of the 180 tile tests, the edge impacts 
produced greater total deformation, demonstrating the effect of impact surface area 
on damage.  All tests in both studies used 90° impact angles and produced curves for 
impact locations not directly supported by framing. 
WBD impact experiments to a range structural insulated wall and concrete masonry 
wall configurations were carried out by Chen and Hao (2015) and McDonald (1990) 
respectively. Chen and Hao (2015) conducted 2 × 4  timber impact tests to 14 wall 
panels. They found walls with ductile skin materials had a higher penetration 
resistance capacity than walls with brittle rigid skin materials such as fibre cement, 
even if the brittle materials possessed higher compressive strengths. McDonald (1990) 
launched 15 lb, 2 × 4  timber missiles at 11 concrete masonry wall specimens of 
various configurations. The study found that reinforced masonry cells could resist 
timber missile puncture by causing missiles to splinter when impact velocity was over 
100 mph. Unreinforced cells were perforated by missiles travelling over 65 mph unless 
the panel was tilted to produce a 45° oblique impact angle. In these cases the missile 
tended to bounce off the panel without causing damage. Masters et al. (2010) also 
found that oblique impact angles produced less damage than perpendicular impacts 
with the same kinetic energy during tests on glass sheets impacted by roof shingles.    
Projectile impacts to reinforced concrete targets have been extensively studied for 
both military and civil applications over the last century (e.g. Yankelevsky, 1997; Chen 
et al., 2004; Warren et al., 2004; Li and Hao, 2014; Imran Latif et al., 2015). 
Stephenson et al. (1978) and Haldar and Miller (1982) used rocket propelled sleds to 
launch 12 inch steel pipes at reinforced concrete panels to investigate the effect of 
concrete thickness, impact angle and impact location on observed damage. Their 
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studies identified common impact responses for RC and these have been adopted for 
use as damage states in the development of RC slab fragility functions. One common 
impact response with significant implications for property damage and life safety is the 
high velocity ejection of fragments from the back-face of panels when they are 
impacted by projectiles (Li and Hao, 2014; Imran Latif et al., 2015). 
These experimental studies use projectiles, targets and impact velocities that are not 
highly applicable to ballistic impacts to buildings. Many of the impact engineering 
studies reviewed are concerned with the military applications of  high velocity (>400 
m/s) impacts by bullets, rods or metal pellets into targets specifically designed to resist 
damage such as thick steel plates or high strength reinforced concrete (e.g. Bryan, 
1962; Chen et al., 2004; Peng et al., 2015). Hurricane vulnerability studies provide a 
closer simulation of ballistic impacts to buildings as both are concerned with the same 
type of target, namely building claddings and because the impact velocities of WBD 
and relatively slow ballistics are comparable (i.e. 30-50 m/s) (Stephenson et al., 1978; 
Fernandez et al., 2010; Alphonso and Barbato, 2014). However none of the studies 
reviewed used projectiles that adequately simulate ballistic block or bomb impacts.   
 
3.3.2 Methods 
These experiments subjected sheet metal, weatherboard and reinforced concrete 
panels to impacts from volcanic blocks. Blocks weighing 3.5 – 10 kg were launched at 
up to 37 m/s using the University of Canterbury’s ballistic cannon. Panel damage and 
block velocity were recorded using two GoPro cameras. Impact energies from 90 - 
3500 J were calculated and compared to the damage caused by individual tests to 
construct fragility function suites for each cladding type tested. Claddings were fixed 
to timber framing in such a way that structures would fit beneath the cannon apparatus 
whilst adhering to New Zealand building standards as closely as practicable. The 
cannon was constructed to launch blocks with controlled accuracy and speed for 




3.3.2.1 Air cannon apparatus 
The air cannon apparatus is comprised of 4 major components; the pneumatic ram 
which propels blocks into free flight towards targets, the air compressor and barrel 
which supply the pressure force to the ram, the trigger which releases the ram allowing 
built up air pressure to accelerate it forward and the tripod system which absorbs the 
cannon’s recoil during firing (Figure 25). 
 
Figure 25: Testing apparatus schematic. Not to scale. 
The pneumatic ram fits within the barrel and harnesses the pressure built up behind 
it. It consists of a firing rod and plastic piston with a rubber ring around the perimeter. 
The ring forms a seal between the piston and the barrel’s inner wall. The rod provides 
a) the location point for loading blocks onto the cannon and b) a lock that allows 
pressure to be built up inside the barrel prior to firing.   
The barrel is a 1200 mm length of 208 mm diameter drilling pipe. Internally, the barrel 
is divided into an upper air cylinder where pressure is built up and a lower actuating 
cylinder where the ram can accelerate forward (Figure 25). The ram’s forward motion 
is arrested as the piston collides with the end of the actuating cylinder. This propels 
the block from the rod sending it into free flight towards the target below. 
The ram and barrel are held in the air by a tripod which is attached to a set of 1000 
litre water tanks (Figure 25). The tripod system reduces recoil during firing but also 
constrains the height and dimensions of test structures as they must fit under the 
cannon within a test space of around 1 m3. The tripod also holds the barrel in the air 
so that a greater flight distance can be achieved by projectiles allowing for more 
accurate velocity measurements from video recordings. 
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3.3.2.2 Impact energy measurements 
As outlined in the equation from section 3.2.3, a ballistic’s impact energy is dependent 
upon its mass and final velocity. To measure impact energy the mass of each block 
was recorded prior to testing and the velocity of blocks during individual experiments 
was measured using videos from two GoPro cameras filming at their highest frame 
rate of 240 frames per second. To measure the velocity of a block, the number of 
frames taken by cameras during a block’s flight were counted then compared to flight 
distance. Frame counting began from when the block first started moving to when it 
first touched the test structure. This distance was then measured and divided by the 
flight time to calculate velocity. 
3.3.2.2.1 Impact energy measurements for oblique impacts 
For oblique impacts, impact energy was initially measured using the same method as 
for perpendicular impacts described above. However, studies of high velocity impacts 
to concrete, metal and soil targets in the field of impact engineering have shown 
oblique impacts typically cause less damage than perpendicular impacts of the same 
energy (Bruce, 1962; Bryan, 1962; Kar, 1979; McDonald, 1990; Chen et al., 2004; 
Masters et al., 2010). There were not enough materials available to produce fragility 
functions at several specific impact obliquities. Instead, impacts with obliquities 
ranging 20-70° were carried out for all three types of cladding and the normal 
component of impact energy was resolved for each test so that data from different 
testing conditions could be aggregated. To calculate the normal component of impact 
energy, first the normal component of velocity must be calculated. The equation used 
by Bryan (1962) and Bruce (1962) to calculate the normal component of impact 
velocity is set out below. 
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑉𝑛) =  𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑉𝑜) × 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝜃 
Where 𝜃 is impact obliquity, defined in Chapter 2 as the angle between a missile’s 
incoming trajectory and a line perpendicular to the face of a target. This reduced 
velocity was then used in place of the original velocity to calculate the normal 
component of impact energy so that damage from oblique impacts could be used to 
create fragility functions consistent with perpendicular impacts.       
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3.3.2.3 Block projectiles 
Volcanic rocks from the Taupo Volcanic Zone (TVZ) and Halswell Quarry in 
Christchurch weighing between 3.5 and 10.0 kg were used as the projectiles in this 
testing (Figure 26). The TVZ rocks were andesite with an average density of 2569 
kg/m3, similar to that of the most commonly ejected ballistic block lithology from the 
2012 eruption of Upper Te Maari (Breard et al., 2014; Fitzgerald et al., 2014). 
Aluminium mandrels (Figure 26B) were fitted to each block to allow for intimate contact 
between the block and the ram, giving more controlled flight paths and preventing the 
ram from shattering blocks. To further decrease the likelihood of blocks shattering, 
only relatively dense blocks were used. For the metal and weatherboard tests, this 
meant the same block could be used for nearly all of the shots, decreasing the number 
of variables responsible for observed impacts. These blocks were examined for chips 
after each test to ensure block weight remained constant. Using blocks of the same 
weight throughout a set of experiments also gave a near linear relationship between 
the barrel’s air pressure and the block’s velocity, allowing for better control on impact 
energies during tests. 
The same exact block could not be used for all shots fired at the reinforced concrete 
slabs as most blocks were damaged beyond use after only one shot. To reduce 
variability in the experiments 11 of the 16 different blocks used, were all the same rock 
unit, Stoddart Basalt from Halswell Quarry in Christchurch. TVZ andesite blocks were 
used as the remaining five projectiles in these tests. To investigate the effect of rock 
strength on projectile impacts, strength and density tests were carried out on the basalt 
blocks and on andesite blocks from Mt Ruapehu, similar to the ones used in testing. 
The basalt blocks were tested by laboratory technicians from the University of 
Canterbury’s Department of Geological Sciences and tests on andesite from Mt 
Ruapehu were conducted by a fourth year University of Canterbury engineering 
geology student (Cook, 2015). The basalt blocks were denser and stronger than the 






Table 11: Summary of strength and density tests carried out on both projectile types. Cook’s test 
methods were in accordance with Ulusay and Hudson (2007).  
Test 









Bulk density (kg/m3) 3027 16 2569 5 
Unconfined compressive 
strength (Mpa) 
187 25 98 5 
Point load strength (Mpa) 7.15 35 Not tested 0 
 
 
Figure 26: Volcanic rocks used as projectiles during testing. A) Stoddart Basalt from Halswell quarry 
used in the concrete tests. B) TVZ andesite blocks used in the sheet metal, timber framing and 




3.3.2.4 Cladding materials tested 
Three different types of cladding materials were tested to produce suites of fragility 
curves that quantify the cladding’s vulnerability to ballistic impacts. Large quantities of 
sheet metal and rimu bevel-back weatherboards were donated for testing by the 
Pumphouse Salvage Yard in Christchurch and reinforced concrete slabs were 
prepared by Stahlton Precast. Sheet metal and weatherboards were chosen for testing 
as these comprise the two most commonly used roof and wall claddings in the 
Auckland building stock respectively. The cladding panels were subjected to impacts 
of various angles and framing configurations to capture the range of impacts that 
claddings could be subjected to during an eruption. 
3.3.2.4.1 Sheet metal tests 
The sheet metal impact tests consisted of 50 shots fired at steel and aluminium sheet 
metal panels under varying conditions. The same 3.5 kg andesite block was used 
during all tests and it sustained no significant mass loss throughout testing. Twenty 
shots were used to develop fragility functions for impacts where ballistics a) have 
impact trajectories perpendicular to the plane of the sheet and b) impact the metal at 
a location where it spans between framing members (Figure 27). This impact scenario 
was chosen to test the accuracy of Blong’s (1981) study. 
 
Figure 27: Perpendicular cladding strike tests. A) The cladding has been impacted where it spans 
between framing members. B) Snapshot from Test 29 illustrating cladding orientation perpendicular to 
the block’s trajectory (red line).   
Sheet cladding materials are expected to be highly vulnerable to impacts of this type 







members and because perpendicular impacts absorb maximum impact energy 
compared to oblique impacts which have the potential to deflect impacts. To capture 
the increased resilience cladding has for oblique impacts and impacts to framing, 
additional tests were conducted.  
3.3.2.4.1.1 Perpendicular cladding strike experiments 
These experiments were used to produce fragility functions from 20 shots fired at 
corrugated steel roof cladding panels 0.52 mm thick. The panels were fixed to a timber 
frame according to the New Zealand Building Code (Department of Building and 
Housing 2011). The frame itself was built to comply with NZS:3604 for timber framed 
buildings as closely as practicable. It was made using H1.2 treated timber with the 
maximum member spacing for a high wind zone roof, of 90 and 60 cm spacings 
between the centres of purlins and rafters respectively. The test structures could not 
fully comply with building standards for several reasons.  Limited space beneath the 
cannon apparatus was the main constraint on building more accurate model 
structures. Other discrepancies such as having to fix sheet metal over two purlins as 
opposed to the requisite three and the fact that all salvaged metal had slight defects 
are assumed to have little effect on impact resistance. Defects included all salvaged 
sheets already having screw holes from their original fixing and some having isolated 
areas of rust damage at their unpainted edges. 
3.3.2.4.1.2 Perpendicular timber framing strike experiments 
These experiments consisted of 14 shots using the same 3.5 kg block projectile and 
basic frame design as previous experiments. The only difference to the frame was the 
addition of a third ‘rafter’ down the centre which projectiles would be targeted at. The 
same H1.2 treated timber was used and vertical support studs were installed under 




Figure 28: Framing set ups for A) perpendicular timber framing strike experiments and B) inclined 
cladding strike experiments. 
3.3.2.4.1.3 Inclined cladding strike experiments 
These experiments consisted of 16 shots with obliquities of 20-70°. The same 3.5 kg 
block and frame configuration was used as in the initial perpendicular tests with the 
exception of the frame’s leg lengths being changed to produce different impact 
obliquities (Figure 28B). Another key difference between these tests and the 
perpendicular ones was the type of metal used. All but one of the steel sheet panels 
were damaged preventing re-use during the two previous types of tests. The other five 
panels used in this final round of tests were all made of 0.6mm aluminium sheets which 
despite being slightly thicker, were significantly lighter and more malleable than the 
steel sheets. Therefore, the impact resistance of these sheets is expected to be lower 
than that of the steel sheets and the two tests are not easily comparable. However 
these tests still provide information on whether or not high obliquity impacts cause less 
damage than lower obliquity impacts of the same energy. This information can allow 
for more accurate modelling of damage caused by oblique strikes in ballistic risk and 
impact assessments. 
3.3.2.4.2 Weatherboard tests 
These tests used rimu and pine bevel-back weatherboards fixed to a frame of similar 
design to that used for the inclined sheet metal tests (Figure 29). This allowed 
weatherboard test panels to be impacted by ballistics striking with high obliquities 
between 75 -60°. This was done to simulate impacts to vertical walls which commonly 
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experience higher obliquities than roofs. The initial 75° obliquity was chosen based on 
my use of a hazard model with a mean ballistic impact angle of 75° for ballistics landing 
between 0.5 and 2 km from vent (hazard model presented in Chapter 4).  
  
Figure 29: Weatherboard test panel design: A) use of salvaged bevel-back weatherboards B) original 
nails still attached and leg length varied to simulate steep wall pitch.  
The weatherboards were fixed to the frame using 75×3.5 mm flat head annular nails 
fixed 10 mm above the top of the previous board. Regulation rose head nails specified 
for use in the New Zealand Building Code (E2: External moisture) were not used in 
these tests but this deviation from code was assumed to have little effect on the 
structural strength of the nail connection. The weatherboards were generally of good 
condition aside from their original nails still being attached (Figure 29). Rimu 
weatherboards were commonly used in New Zealand construction pre 1970 with Pinus 
radiata being more commonly used since then (Elkink, 2011). 
  
3.3.2.4.3 Reinforced concrete slab tests 
These tests consisted of 27 shots fired at 19 separate RC slabs, designed to fit the 
New Zealand specifications for roof slabs (NZS:3101, 2006). To investigate the effect 
of concrete strength on impact response, half of the slabs were cured to have an 
unconfined compressive strength of 25 mPa and the other half were cured to 35 mPa. 
Unconfined compressive strength tests carried out on 24 standard concrete cylinders 







Records of the compressive strength testing can be found in Appendix B2. Aside from 
the strength difference, all other specifications were kept the same (Table 12). 
Length and width (mm)  1000x1000 
Thickness (mm) 75 
Reinforcement bar diameter (mm) 10 
Two-way reinforcement bar spacing (mm) 200 
Slab weight (kg) ~190 
Unconfined compressive strength target (mPa) 25 and 35 
Average unconfined compressive strength from 
testing (mPa)  36 and 35 
Table 12: RC slab specifications and strength test results.  
The testing regime planned for tests to be carried out on 24 separate slabs with 12 
slabs placed for perpendicular impacts and 12 for oblique impacts. However, due to 
the repeated firing of the cannon at its maximum air pressure, the piston of the cannon 
was eventually destroyed, preventing it from maintaining pressure. As a result, further 
testing could not be carried out in time for this thesis. To develop one suite of fragility 
functions from these two sets of experiments (normal and oblique impacts), the normal 
component of impact energy was resolved using the equation above in section 
3.3.2.2.1.  
 
3.3.2.4.4 Data recorded from impact tests 
Multiple variables were recorded for each test including the weight and speed of the 
projectile, its impact location and the post impact condition of the cladding. The post-
impact condition (e.g. nails bent, screws snapped, length of tears in sheet metal, 
scratches, cracks etc.) was recorded using photos taken before and after impact. For 
photos of the tests, refer to Appendix B1. For each test the damage could be classified 
into one of four damage states. A different set of specific damage state descriptions 
were applied to each building material based on its unique failure mechanisms (Table 
13). However the same general amount of damage can be attributed to each damage 
state across all the building materials with Damage State 0 equating to either no visible 
damage or slight cosmetic damage, Damage State 1 for cosmetic damage, Damage 
State 2 for moderate damage without ballistic perforation and Damage State 3 for 
perforation of the material.  
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Table 13: Damage state descriptions for ballistic impacts to sheet metal, timber framing, 
weatherboards or reinforced concrete slabs. 
Sheet metal cladding 
Damage state Damage description 
DS 0 No damage – cosmetic scratches 
DS 1 Cosmetic denting 
DS 2 
Tearing (at impact site or around 
connections) 
DS 3 Ballistic perforation 
    
Timber framing (clad in sheet metal) 
Damage state Damage description 
DS 0 No visible damage  
DS 1 Denting to framing 
DS 2 
Cracking, splitting or loss of nail 
connections 
DS 3 Ballistic perforation 
  
Reinforced concrete slabs  
Damage State Damage description 
DS 0 No damage - cosmetic front-face damage  
DS 1 
Front-face cratering and/or back-face 
cracking  
DS 2 Back-face scabbing 
DS 3 
Perforation (ballistic perforation did not 
occur)  
    
Bevel-back weatherboards 
Damage State Damage description 
DS 0 No damage – cosmetic denting 
DS 1 Boards cracked but still in contact 
DS 2 Boards cracked apart 
DS 3 Ballistic perforation 
 
For the concrete tests, additional damage data was recorded to assess the threat that 
ejected concrete fragments pose to building occupants and property when they are 
ejected from the back-face of the slab following impacts. Peng et al (2015) estimate 
that rear shear fragments have ejection velocities equal to ~20% of the residual 
velocity of the projectile. Residual velocity is the velocity of a projectile after it has lost 
kinetic energy by perforating a target (Kar, 1979). For ballistic impacts to RC panels, 
severe backface scabbing can occur even though the ballistic itself is often too large 
to perforate in-between reinforcing bars (Figure 21). This complicates the Kar, (1979) 
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model for residual velocity calculations and associated fragment ejection velocity 
estimates, making this aspect of ballistic impacts a source of uncertainty for risk 
assessments. In these experiments we aim to establish a relationship between the 
velocity of ballistics and the velocity of fragments they eject. This relationship can be 
used to estimate fragment velocities from higher velocity ballistic impacts, giving 
insights on expected interior damage costs and occupant safety in reinforced concrete 
buildings. 
   
3.3.3 Results 
Processed damage data for all three cladding types are presented in a series of bin 
plots. These plots have been used to derive fragility functions using the same 
methodology outlined above in section 3.2.3. Raw damage data for the three cladding 
types are provided in Appendices B3. 
3.3.3.1Sheet metal tests 
3.3.3.1.1Perpendicular cladding strike experiments 
For the perpendicular cladding strike experiments, the 20 data points were put into a 
bin plot but could not be divided equally between the four bins (Figure 30).  This was 
due to multiple data points with the same impact energy value which could not be split 
into separate bins.   
 
Figure 30: Bin plot of damage data for individual ballistic strikes perpendicular to the plane of 
corrugated sheet metal at a location where the cladding spans between framing members. 
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Figure 31 shows three fragility functions with one function for each damage state 
recognised in Table 13. Unlike the ‘standard’ functions used in seismic building fragility 
studies which are a cumulative log normal (Baker, 2014; Rossetto et al., 2014), each 
of these functions is made up of linear segments which connect adjacent data points. 
Functions made up of linear segments have been developed in several past 
vulnerability studies (e.g. Herbin and Barbato, 2012; Wilson, 2015). The functions 
show that higher impact energies correlate with increased likelihood of higher damage 
states occurring.   
 
Figure 31: Fragility functions for individual ballistic strikes perpendicular to the plane of corrugated 
sheet metal at a location where the cladding spans between framing members. 
3.3.3.1.2Perpendicular timber framing strike experiments 
The framing strike experiments were also processed into a bin plot for the 
development of fragility functions (Figure 32). The functions show that cladding which 
is supported by framing has a higher impact resistance than cladding that spans 
between framing (Figure 33). Comparison of their DS3 fragility functions shows the 
impact energy required to perforate timber supported cladding is around double the 
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Figure 32: Bin plot for individual ballistic strikes perpendicular to the plane of corrugated sheet metal 
at a location where the cladding was directly supported by framing members. 
 
Figure 33: Fragility functions for individual ballistic strikes perpendicular to the plane of corrugated 
sheet metal at a location where the cladding is directly supported by framing members. 
  
3.3.3.1.3Inclined cladding strike experiments 
These experiments investigated the damage produced from different impact 
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shots were taken at four different obliquities from 40-70° and damage was categorised 
into the same three damage states as in previous sheet metal tests (Figure 34). 
Comparing raw data from the inclined and perpendicular impact tests, claddings are 
more resistant to DS1 and DS2 damage at higher impact obliquities than they are for 
perpendicular impacts of the same energy (Figure 35). However, two of the inclined 
tests (50 and 51) resulted in DS3 despite impact energy being below the minimum 
DS3 threshold for perpendicular impacts. These low impact energies are likely to have 
resulted in DS3 damage because the sheet metal panel used in these tests was made 
of the weaker, lighter aluminium compared to the steel used in the perpendicular tests. 
Also the second impact location influenced by the first impact location further 
weakening the panel (Figure 36D).    
 

























Inclined steel sheet raw data




























Inclined and perpendicular sheet metal raw data
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Figure 36: Relatively weak aluminium sheet metal used in tests 50 and 51. A) pre-test condition, B) 
post-test 50 condition 468 J impact energy , C) post-test 51 condition 393 J impact energy, D) close 
up on perforation site. 
 
Figure 37: Bin plot for individual ballistic strikes oblique to the plane of corrugated sheet metal at a 
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Figure 38: Fragility functions for individual ballistic strikes oblique to the plane of corrugated sheet 
metal at a location where the cladding spans between framing members. 
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When the fragility functions from the two sets of tests are compared, inclined impacts 
(using the normal component of impact energy as their HIM) appear to be significantly 
more vulnerable (Figure 39). The impact condition of panels after oblique impacts, with 
long scratches preceding perforations, suggests a high component of shear stress is 
responsible for the damage (Figure 40). This shear component is disregarded during 
calculation of the normal component of impact energy. This means perforation 
potential from oblique ballistic impacts cannot be accurately measured using the same 
method as in high velocity impact engineering studies. This is an important area of 
future ballistic impacts research.  
 
Figure 40: Scratches preceding main impact location of sheet metal following oblique block impact 
tests. A) Illustration of DS3 from Test 45: Original impact energy = 1372 J, Normal component impact 
energy = 343 J. B) Illustration of DS2 from Test 46: Original impact energy = 700 J, Normal 
component impact energy = 175 J. 
3.3.3.2Weatherboard tests 
The weatherboard tests were initially carried out with a 75° obliquity as this was the 
mean obliquity produced for ballistic-wall impacts in the ballistic hazard model used in 
the impact assessment (Chapter 4). Obliquity was reduced to 65° after five shots (two 
fired at the cannon’s maximum air pressure) were unable to cause DS 3 damage 
(Figure 41). The raw data follows the same trend seen in the inclined sheet metal tests, 
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where increased obliquity results in lower damage states for impacts of the same 
energy. The bin plot for this data suggested the likelihood of DS3 being reached or 
exceeded went down with increased impact energy between the last two bins for these 
tests (Figure 42). This was likely due to an incomplete dataset as it is assumed that 
the probability of a given damage state occurring will never decrease for an increased 
hazard intensity. The DS3 function was adjusted to reflect this assumption.  
 
Figure 41: Raw data from weatherboard impact tests at various obliquities. 
 
Figure 42: Bin plot of damage data for individual ballistic strikes to bevel back timber weatherboards. 
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Figure 43: Fragility functions for individual ballistic strikes at impact obliquities of 60-75° to the plane of 
bevel back timber weatherboards. 
3.3.3.3Reinforced Concrete slab tests 
The RC slab tests consisted of 27 shots fired at 19 separate slabs (Figure 44). Due to 
the development of cracks and weakening of the slabs with successive shots, only the 
first shot fired at each slab has been used as a data point for this fragility function suite 
(Figure 45). Reinforced concrete was more resistant to impacts than all the other 
materials tested but results followed the same overall trends as for other materials in 
regards to higher impact energies being required to reach higher damage states and 
the relationship between obliquity and damage. Ballistic perforation was not achieved 
in any of the experiments due to the strength and spacing of the reinforcing bars but 
back-face scabbing (DS2) was able to occur for impact energies as low 1500 joules. 
Compared to the stronger more dense basaltic blocks, blocks from the TVZ showed a 
tendency to shatter into smaller fragments and cause less overall damage to the slabs. 
For example the only experiment resulting in DS0 used a TVZ block that shattered into 
a large number of small pieces, causing only cosmetic damage to the front-face of the 
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The speed and impact energy of fragments ejected from the back-face of the slab was 
calculated using the same methodology as was used for the ballistics. The fragments 
moved significantly slower than the cannon fired ballistic. For DS 2 impacts, fragment 
velocities were on average, ~20% of the ballistic velocity. For DS 3 impacts, fragment 
velocities were on average, ~33% of the ballistic velocity. After weighing the largest 
individual fragments from each experiment, the impact energies of the fragments were 
calculated. All of the fragment impact energies were less than 1% of their ballistic’s 
impact energy. The fragment with the highest impact energy of ~80 J (Figure 46) was 
only slightly below the 100 J threshold for lethal skull fractures suggested by Raymond 
et al. (2009). 
 
Figure 46: The largest three back-face fragments ejected during experiment 7.1. The largest of these, 
weighing 870 grams had an ejection velocity of 48 km/hour (13.5 m/s). 
3.3.3.4Results Summary 
The testing of sheet metal, timber framing, weatherboards and reinforced concrete in 
simulated ballistic block impacts found was used to develop fragility functions to 
quantify their vulnerability. Key patterns identified from the testing include: 
1. Higher impact energies were required to reach higher damage states for all 
materials, making impact energy a suitable HIM for ballistic impact studies. 
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2. For perpendicular ballistic impacts, typical building claddings will only be able 
to resist perforation from ballistics at the lower end of the impact energy range 
(with energy being primarily controlled by the ballistic’s terminal velocity and 
hence mass).     
3. In all materials tested, the impact energy threshold for each damage state was 
significantly higher for strongly oblique impacts (>60°) than for perpendicular 
ones. 
4. Fragments of building materials or ballistics that are ejected/ricocheted post-
impact increase the area of ballistic hazard and have velocities that are 
potentially lethal.   
 
3.3.4 Limitations 
Fragility functions developed using the air cannon apparatus have a number of 
limitations associated with either the inaccurate simulation of ballistic impacts to 
buildings or a low number of experiment repetitions. The limitations in simulating 
impacts can be broken down into inaccurate simulation of ballistic hazard and the 
issues associated with using small sections of specific claddings to represent the walls 
and roofs of real buildings for an entire building stock. The air cannon has been 
specifically designed to launch rocks up to 10 kg at velocities up to 100 m/s, meaning 
this air cannon is more capable of simulating volcanic ballistic impacts than the 
apparatus used in both cyclone vulnerability and impact engineering studies. However, 
there are still aspects of real ballistic impacts that the cannon cannot simulate. First 
and foremost, the maximum speed achieved during testing was 39 m/s, about 1/3 of 
the velocity the blocks used in these tests could reach if they attained terminal velocity 
post eruption (Capaccioni and Cuccoli, 2005). However the speeds reached during 
these tests are appropriate for simulating the lower the terminal velocities of smaller 
blocks. These speeds are also appropriate for simulating bomb impacts from typical 
strombolian eruptions (Gaudin et al., 2014). Another aspect of ballistic hazard that the 
cannon does not reproduce is the spinning that occurs during the flight of pyroclasts 
(Vanderkluysen et al., 2012). The cannon launches rocks with minimal amounts of 
spin which is ideal for maintaining the same impact conditions over multiple tests but 
gives no insight to the different damage that may occur during spinning impacts. All of 
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the experiments have used relatively dense, solid rocks to represent ballistic block 
impacts. The damage and perforation thresholds associated with block impacts are 
likely to be significantly different from those of bombs. Bombs have visco-elastic 
properties, meaning they would be classed as non-rigid missiles which can deform 
considerably on impact compared to target deformation (Li et al., 2006).    
The orientation of a block as it struck a test panel varied from test to test. As the blocks 
used were not spherical, different impact orientations affected the surface area 
connecting with a test panel, adding another variable that could affect observed 
damage. Testing of metal hurricane shutters impacted by concrete tiles found a strong 
relationship between the orientation of the projectile and the amount of deformation 
observed. Side impacts consistently caused more deformation than flat impacts where 
the same kinetic energy was being absorbed by a smaller area of the target 
(Fernandez et al., 2010). If a larger number of tests were to be carried out using the 
same block, the damage from tests of different impact orientations could be analysed 
separately, with different impact orientations classified using the mandrill attachment 
as a fixed reference point.  
Aside from the concrete slabs, building materials used in these experiments were 
salvaged from houses scheduled for demolition. The materials tested are therefore 
likely to be older and weaker than the average cladding they represent in a real 
building stock and resulting fragility functions may be overestimating cladding 
vulnerability. The rimu weatherboards in particular are more prone to splintering than 
other types of weatherboards such as pine (Elkink, 2011). These properties should be 
noted considering the fragility curves derived from tests on rimu will be applied to all 
types of weatherboards during impact assessments. Rimu weatherboards have also 
not been commonly used in construction since the 1960s (Elkink, 2011) meaning 
another type of weatherboard may have been more appropriate as an average 
representative for modern building stocks.  
With the limited supply of building materials available for testing, the fragility functions 
were derived from a relatively small number of data points. Rossetto et al (2014) 
suggest 30 buildings as the minimum requirement for low quality seismic fragility 
functions yet all of the functions presented here use between 14 and 24 data points, 
some of which gained from experiments where the same piece of cladding material 
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was impacted multiple times. To account for these limitations and uncontrolled 
variables in testing, the uncertainty bounds suggested by Jenkins and Spence (2009) 
that +/- 20% of a ballistic’s impact energy be assigned as the 5th and 95th percentile 
values respectively. 
3.4 Discussion 
Despite this testing’s limitations, it has made several important findings with 
implications for ballistic impacts to buildings and appropriate life safety actions for 
those forced to shelter-in place using unreinforced buildings. The test results and life 
safety actions are supported by our research group’s recent post-eruption ballistic 
impact assessments in Japan.  
This testing has found that exterior building claddings are highly vulnerable to impacts 
from solid ballistic blocks, especially if the impact is perpendicular to the face of the 
cladding. Oblique impacts required noticeably higher velocities and impact energies 
to perforate claddings compared to perpendicular strikes, particularly when obliquity 
increased over 60°. This means detailed ballistic-building risk assessments require a 
method for calculating impact obliquity and a method for determining whether a wall 
or roof of a building has been impacted as obliquity will vary considerably between the 
two (see section 4.3.2).  
During the concrete testing, the weaker, lower desnsity TVZ blocks (relative to the 
basaltic blocks) all shattered on their first impact causing markedly less damage than 
basaltic block impacts of comparable impact energy. This suggests rock strength plays 
a role in determining the maximum damage a ballistic can cause when impacting 
relatively strong targets.  This means the variation ballistic impacts to concrete 
structures may be predicted between different volcanoes based on lithology of the 
country rocks which are the source for ballistic blocks. The damage caused by different 
types of ballistics (blocks compared to ‘mudbombs’) was evident at Mt Usu.  The 
strength of country rock is also important in terms of its influence on the density and 
fragmentation of country rock as these properties control ballistic distributions.   
Based on 20 RC slab experiments, the velocity ratio between a ballistic and its 
backface fragments is roughly 4:1 (5:1 for DS2 impacts and 3:1 for DS3 impacts). If 
this ratio remains constant for higher velocity ballistic impacts then fragments from a 
89 
 
100 m/s ballistic impact would be travelling at 25 m/s (90 km/h). At this speed 
fragments weighing 0.5 kg carry a 90% chance of fatality (Baxter and Gresham, 1997).    
From examination of the conical shape of backface impact craters on concrete slabs 
during post-eruption building surveys, it was thought that ejected fragments were likely 
to have exploded outwards from the point of impact.  By analysing videos of the 
fragments ejected during experiments, their trajectories appear mostly confined to 
following the trajectory of the ballistic rather than exploding outwards from the point of 
impact as the conical shape of the craters might suggest. However, because these 
fragments are moving relatively slowly compared to velocities expected from real 
ballistic impacts, their trajectories are likely to be more strongly influenced by gravity 
giving the appearance they are simply following the vertical trajectory of the ballistic. 
Faster moving fragments from higher velocity impacts will be less influenced by gravity 
and may show greater lateral dispersion, increasing the area of hazard inside a 
concrete building impacted by ballistics. This is an area of research that requires more 
attention especially considering many ballistic shelters are made of concrete which 
may not have a high enough impact resistance to prevent high velocity backface 
scabbing  
These experiments support the suggested life safety actions presented in section 
3.2.2, that if people are required to shelter from ballistics in unreinforced buildings, 
they should put as many layers of the building envelope as possible in-between 
themselves and incoming ballistics. Fragments of rock and building materials 
produced in these experiments were too slow to be lethal but because ballistics can 
travel over three times faster than the ones in these tests, their fragments are also 
capable of higher velocities and may become lethal. This means additional cover 




Figure 47: Illustration of the likely least sheltered and most sheltered areas of buildings impacted by 
ballistics based on findings from cannon experiments and post-eruption impact assessments. Line 






Chapter 4 Tephra Impact Assessment 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the development of an impact assessment methodology for 
tephra hazards and presents the results of a tephra hazard impact assessment to 
buildings in Auckland city. For urban environments in volcanically active areas such 
as Auckland city, tephra presents a significant hazard to buildings. The purpose of this 
impact assessment is to quantify the severity of damage to buildings so likely building 
repair costs and the loss of building functionality can be predicted. The approach uses 
a geographic information system (GIS) to model the interaction between hazard, 
exposure, and vulnerability (Figure 48), with a key feature being the use of fragility 
functions presented in Chapters 2 and 3. The chapter addresses risk analysis and risk 
evaluation stages of the risk management framework. 
 




4.2 Tephra impact assessment approach 
For simplicity, a deterministic approach to hazard assessment was adopted to assess 
the distribution of ballistics and tephra fall using the Exercise Ruaumoko AVF eruption 
scenario (Lindsay et al., 2010). For exposure, a three-dimensional building exposure 
inventory was developed to determine which buildings would be impacted by tephra 
in this scenario. Vulnerability was then determined by assigning the appropriate 
fragility or vulnerability functions to each building in the exposure inventory. 
4.2.1 Exposure inventory development 
The first step taken to develop an exposure inventory for buildings is an initial 
identification of what essential building information is required to model ballistic and 
tephra fall impacts. The required information is then compared with the available 
databases and the information they contain to determine what additional data must be 
obtained and to justify the estimation of data that could not be obtained.    
Building exposure attributes that influence tephra impacts to buildings have been 
identified in Chapter 2 (blue boxes in Figure 9 (tephra fall) and Figure 11 (ballistics)). 
The two databases used to develop this exposure inventory contain information on the 
majority (but not all) of these exposure attributes. The attributes that are not captured 
in the databases have been estimated based on building codes, building surveys and 
additional modelling. This exposure inventory was developed using building footprints 
from the Auckland Council Geospatial Team’s building database combined with 
RiskScape’s building asset database. The RiskScape programme has developed an 
asset database for buildings in Auckland and around New Zealand (Paulik, 2015). The 
database contains information on building attributes relevant to tephra impacts 
including (but not limited to) construction type, cladding type, roof pitch, contents value 
and replacement cost. The database was created primarily using data from Quotable 
Value NZ (QV) (King and Bell, 2009). The QV data was used because it covers all of 
New Zealand, but there is some data that is incomplete, inaccurate or uncertain due 
to on-going modification of buildings in the study area and data collection errors (King 
and Bell, 2009). An issue which required addressing was that the QV data is only 
gathered for buildings with a footprint over 30 square metres yet the Auckland 
Council’s building footprints have been digitised for buildings smaller than this 
meaning the database has no data on these structures. To account for this in the 
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ballistic impacts scenario, any building without data was assumed to have the most 
common cladding and construction type from the database. For the tephra fall impact 
assessment, instead of having to assume the roof pitch, roof cladding, construction 
type and estimating the replacement cost of each structure, structures without 
RiskScape’s data were omitted from the assessment. Other developments required to 
make the exposure inventory functional involved the accurate spatial representation 
of buildings, in two dimensions for tephra fall impacts and three dimensions for ballistic 
impacts. This required the merging and simple modification of the two databases, 
which is outlined below.   
To spatially represent buildings for both the ballistic and tephra fall impact 
assessments the first step was to take RiskScape’s building data points and expand 
them into a two-dimensional area across each point’s corresponding footprint (Figure 
49). As tephra fall is predominantly deposited on a building’s roof, the building 
exposure inventory for this assessment can remain two-dimensional. For the ballistic 
impact assessment, impacts were recorded when a ballistic trajectory spatially 
intersected with a building and impacts to a building’s walls or roof needed to be 
differentiated. This required building footprints to be extruded into three dimensions 
based on the building’s height.  To determine the height each building should be 
extruded to, information on each building’s floor height and number of storeys was 
combined using the following equation:  
𝐻𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  = 𝐻𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 + (𝑆 × 2.5)  
Where 𝐻𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the total height in metres,  𝐻𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 is the floor height in metres and S is 
the number of storeys. This equation assumes an average of 2.5 metres per storey 
and produces three dimensional polygons with vertical ‘walls’ and flat horizontal ‘floors’ 




Figure 49: Example of spatial representation of buildings: A) Buildings represented as points in the 
RiskScape building database. B) The same buildings represented as polygons from the Auckland 
Council Geospatial Team’s building database. Note that the red building footprints contain no points 
as they are below the footprint size that RiskScape’s database has information for. 
At this stage the exposure inventory contains essential information on the spatial 
extent of each building, the building’s construction type (e.g. light timber frame), and 
the type of claddings used on walls and roofs. This specific information is used to 
determine which fragility or vulnerability functions should be used to assess impact 
when the building exposure and tephra hazard models are combined. However, a 
major limitation of the Riskscape and Auckland Council database in terms of modelling 
ballistic impacts is that they do not provide information on the extent of roofs and walls 
which are made of highly vulnerable glass windows or significantly less vulnerable 
framing members. It is important to quantify the spatial extent of framing and windows 
so that ballistic impacts to either material can be differentiated.   
One approach to quantifying the extent of framing is to refer to the New Zealand 
building code to calculate the area of the building envelope profile that may be 
composed of framing for a typical building. For standard roofs built to the New Zealand 
Building Code (in high wind zones) the maximum spacing for 90×45 mm rafters and 
purlins are 600 mm and 900 mm respectively (Department of Building and Housing, 
2010). This means the smallest spacing between members is 600 mm and any ballistic 
with a diameter greater than this has a 100% chance of striking framing. Similarly for 
external walls 90 × 45 mm studs and dwangs are spaced at 480 mm and 1350 mm 
respectively. This configuration means any wall struck by a ballistic over 480 mm in 
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diameter must strike framing. To simply calculate the probability that a ballistic will 
strike faming, the ballistic diameter was divided by the minimum framing spacing. The 
average diameter of ballistics impacting buildings in this scenario is ~440 mm and 
oblique impacts have a reduced space through which they can pass between framing 
members compared to perpendicular impacts. This is likely to result in a large number 
of timber framed buildings receiving impacts directly to their framing. Each impact to 
framing is simply recorded as one impact. This can be considered a minimal value as 
ballistic strikes with high obliquities take a longer trajectory through the wall and 
therefore have a high chance of striking multiple framing components (e.g. Figure 19).  
To account for wall areas made of windows, the proportion of wall area taken up by 
windows in the impacted zones was undertaken using photos from Google Streetview. 
A total of 20 buildings from different addresses which were impacted by ballistics were 
part of this analysis and although a more thorough analysis would have been 
preferable, due to time constraints, only residential buildings (the most common 
building use type in Auckland) were investigated. Buildings were chosen from different 
areas around Mangere in order to gain a representative sample of buildings from 
different socio-economic areas. Also an equal number of walls with different directional 
aspects were analysed to account for north-facing walls likely having a higher 
proportion of window coverage. The Streetview analysis calculated that windows make 
up ~20% of the area of walls for the houses assessed. The data and methodology of 
this analysis is presented in Appendix B5.  
 
4.2.2 Tephra hazard modelling 
In this impact assessment, tephra fall hazard was modelled using the advection-
diffusion model TEPHRA2 (Bonadonna et al., 2005) and ballistic hazard was modelled 
using the 3D ballistic trajectory Tsunematsu model (Tsunematsu et al., 2014). 
Calculating the HIM for tephra fall (loading on roofs) required tephra deposit bulk 
density and thicknesses to be modelled. TEPHRA2 modelled thickness in different 
areas and two end-member densities were selected based on their previous use in the 
RiskScape programme. For ballistic hazard, the impact energy of ballistic strikes to 
buildings was calculated using the impact energy output from the Tsunematsu model, 
then the impact obliquity was found to resolve the normal component of impact energy.   
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4.2.2.1   Tephra fall hazard development 
Using the TEPHRA2 model, two approaches to representing tephra thickness in 
ArcGIS include the use of rasters or isopachs (Figure 50: Tephra thickness 
representation methods using isopachs (black lines) with 11 different thickness ranges 
and using a raster grid with over 500 different tephra thicknesses (red to green grid 
squares).). To more accurately model thickness, a 50x50 m resolution raster grid was 
chosen over the isopachs. Once tephra fall thickness has been modelled, tephra fall 
deposits must be assigned a bulk density value to calculate loading. A dry tephra 
density value of 1000 kg/m3 has been chosen for this impact assessment as it is the 
default value used in RiskScape and it has been used in previous tephra impact 
studies (e.g. Bonadonna et al. 2005; Biass and Bonadonna 2013). For tephra 
saturated by rain,  density is increased by 50% to 1500 kg/m3 as this is the value used 
for wet tephra in RiskScape ( as opposed to a maximum, 100% density increase 
suggested by Macedonio and Costa (2012)). 
 
Figure 50: Tephra thickness representation methods using isopachs (black lines) with 11 different 
thickness ranges and using a raster grid with over 500 different tephra thicknesses (red to green grid 




4.2.2.2Ballistic hazard modelling 
To assess the impact of ballistic projectiles in a GIS, the first step is to establish where 
ballistics will impact in space (i.e. create a ballistic hazard footprint).  This can be 
completed by either mapping previous ballistics from an eruption, or by using a 
numerical model to estimate the distribution where ballistics may impact the ground 
surface.  Ideally, each point (i.e. where the ballistic impacts the ground) will contain 
hazard intensity information which informs the degree of damage the ballistic may 
cause.  This may include impact energy, temperature, trajectory, diameter, etc.. The 
Tsunematsu ballistic model used in this impact assessment provides this information 
and differs from most of its counterparts by considering the trajectory of multiple 
particles and their collisions in three dimensions, to output a two dimensional 
distribution of impacts on the ground (Tsunematsu et al., 2014).   This model requires 
a set of input parameters to run and to model an appropriate ballistic distribution (i.e. 
one that is likely or expected to occur at the site of the impact assessment), the input 
parameters should be selected based on a literature review outlining the expected 
style and intensity of volcanism. In accordance with this, input parameters for two end 
member AVF eruption styles were chosen from a literature review into the ballistic 
hazard from past AVF eruptions and eruptions from other volcanoes which may be 
considered analogous.  
Few ballistic deposits have been mapped in the AVF and attempting to map ballistic 
distributions from deposits has been made difficult due to urban development, 
quarrying and weathering of the deposits (Houghton et al., 1996). Due to there being 
limited research on the range of ballistic impacts, no mapped ballistic deposits and no 
observed eruptions in the AVF, analogous eruptions from more intensely studied 
volcanoes have also been used to parameterise the model (Table 14). The modelled 
distributions below represent the ballistic hazard for Strombolian and Vulcanian scale 
phreatic eruptions situated in Manukau Harbour (Figure 51 and Figure 52).   
One parameter that can be well constrained from studying ballistic deposits within the 
AVF is particle density. Particle density for strombolian eruptions was modelled at 
1300 kg/m3 based on values of Strombolian deposits found around the AVF and from 
similar values from an analogue monogenetic volcano, Paricutin, Mexico (Houghton 
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et al., 1999; Pioli et al., 2008). For the Vulcanian phreatic eruption, mean particle 
density was modelled at 2000 kg/m3 based on the densities of basaltic lavas and 
country rock around Auckland (1700 – 2000 and 2000 – 2200 kg/m3 respectively) 
(Houghton et al., 1999; Kereszturi et al., 2013).  
In regards to range of ballistic projectiles, Allen and Smith (1994) suggest the 
maximum range for ballistics in the AVF will be between 2-3 km of the vent for ballistics 
ejected during  violent, ‘wet’ phreatomagmatic eruptions. The maximum range of 
ballistics from the ‘wet’ Vulcanian phreatic eruption is modelled as 1.7 km, so the range 
of ballistics in this scenario can be considered credible.  The maximum range from the 
Strombolian eruption was < 500 m which constrained ballistics to fall within the harbour 
(Figure 51), so a full ballistic impact assessment was only carried out for the Vulcanian 
phreatic eruption. For further detail on the values used to parameterise the model, 
refer to Appendix A. 
Table 14: Tsunematsu model input parameters for a Strombolian and a Vulcanian phreatic eruption. 
The literature review providing these input parameters was carried out by Rebecca Fitzgerald (90%) 
and myself (10%) and is presented in Appendix A. 
  Strombolian Phreatic (Vulcanian) 
Parameter Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation 
Particle density (kg/m³) 1300 200 2000 300 
Particle diameter (m) 0.48 0.23 (0.064 - 4.59) 0.36 0.23 (0.064 - 3) 
Magnitude of initial velocity (m/s) 50 50 (up to 400m/s) 200 50 
Ballistic ejection angle  
(° from vertical) 
  20   50 
Vent inclination angle  
(° from vertical) 
0   0   
Displacement of ejection points 
from the vent centre (m) 
 5  5 
Number of particles per burst 780  13000  
Number of bursts 38   11   
Direction (North is 0°) 0  0  
Flow velocity (m/s) 100   150   




Figure 51: Distribution of ballistics from a single Strombolian burst from Ruaumoko volcano (LINZ 
Auckland 0.5m Rural Aerial Photos (2010-2012)). Map produced by Rebecca Fitzgerald. 
 
Figure 52: Distribution of ballistics from a Vulcanian eruption from Ruaumoko volcano (LINZ Auckland 





One advantage of using a three dimensional ballistics model for building impact 
assessment is that the trajectory of each ballistic can be imported directly into a GIS 
(in this case, ArcScene) to determine where it may have struck the building (i.e.  roof, 
wall or the intersection between the two) as this will influence which fragility function 
is used, the obliquity calculation (and thus associated hazard intensity of the ballistic) 
and hence the overall damage  (Figure 53).  
  
Figure 53: Two ArcScenes illustrating ballistic hazard and building exposure in 2D and 3D. In 2D, 
ballistic impact locations are represented using red dots. In 3D ballistic impact trajectories are 
represented using purple cylinders.  
 
However, developing the model so that it can import 3D trajectories into ArcScene will 
require further collaboration with the model developers and was ultimately considered 
beyond the scope of a masters thesis.  Therefore, a simplified approach was taken to 
model ballistic impact trajectories in three dimensions.  Firstly a 2D line between each 
block’s impact point and the vent was digitised (i.e. the flight path projected to the 
ground surface).  Next trigonometry was used to add a Z coordinate to the vent end of 
the line so that this line’s angle would be equal to its ballistic’s impact angle (see 
example Figure 54 ). This assumes that the trajectory of a ballistic over its final ~5-20 
metres of flight follows a straight line but it should be very similar to the trajectory at 




Figure 54: Example of the trigonometry used to approximately model the end of a ballistic’s trjectory 
(red line) using its range and impact angle. Z is the height to which the vent end of the line must be 
raised so that the impact end of the line approximates the ballistic’s true parabolic trajectory (blue line) 
which is calculated in Matlab using the Tsunematsu model.    
4.2.3 Building vulnerability modelling   
Once building exposure and tephra hazard have been characterised, fragility and 
vulnerability functions are used to relate these two components to determine impact 
(Figure 48). For functions to determine impact effectively they must be attributed to 
the building materials or building structure they have been developed for (i.e. a ballistic 
fragility function for reinforced concrete cannot accurately model impacts to a brick 
masonry wall). Therefore, building vulnerability has been modelled by assigning the 
appropriate set of fragility or vulnerability functions to each building in the exposure 
inventory based on attributes within the exposure inventory.  
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4.2.3.1 Assigning tephra fall functions to buildings 
For tephra fall, construction type has been identified as the strongest indicator of 
building vulnerability (e.g. Spence et al., 1996; Jenkins et al., 2014; Maqsood et al., 
2015). This means of all the building attributes within RiskScape’s building asset 
database, ‘construction class’ has been chosen as the most suitable attribute for 
function assignment to be based on.  From the selection of previously developed 
functions in section 2.4 the most widely applicable suite is arguably that from the 
United Nations Global Assessment of Risk 2015 (Maqsood et al., 2015). The relatively 
large number of different building typologies in the report’s ‘global building schema’ 
(which ranges from adobe buildings through to engineered reinforced concrete 
buildings) contains several typologies that can be used to represent the range of 
buildings in Auckland and their vulnerability to tephra fall hazards. Also if the 
vulnerability functions are to be used within RiskScape in the future then they are also 
applicable from the point of view that similar vulnerability functions (in regards to 
damage ratio) have been used by RiskScape in the past (King and Bell, 2009). A final 
reason for the selection of vulnerability functions over fragility functions was because 
none of the previously developed tephra fall fragility functions have considered 
damage states below roof collapse meaning they would not be able model lesser 
damage at lower hazard intensities. Vulnerability functions on the other hand can be 
used to output an estimated dollar value for building repair cost across the full range 
of hazard intensity.      
There are nine construction classes recognised within the database that are present 
in the Auckland building stock, however only six vulnerability functions have been 
selected to capture the likely differences in building performance (Figure 55). This has 
been done because although a the full range of different construction classes 
recognised in RiskScape’s database may be relevant for modelling building 
performance under earthquake or flooding hazards, based on the description of 
building classes in Paulik (2015), several of the 12 classes are assumed to perform 
similarly under tephra loading meaning classes can be aggregated (Table 16Error! 
Reference source not found.). By assigning a function to each construction type in 
the database, vulnerability has been matched with exposure. This means once the 
tephra load on each building has been modelled for a particular eruption scenario, the 




Figure 55: Building vulnerability functions for tephra loading. Typologies and function attributes given 
in Table 15. 
Table 15: Building typologies and parameters of the functions in Figure 55. Note that low pitch roofs 
are angled less than 6 degrees, medium pitch roofs are between 6 and 35 degrees and high pitch 
roofs are over 35 degrees. 
Building typology 
GAR 
identifier Median (θ) Standard deviation (β) 
Light timber frame, engineered, low 
rise, medium roof pitch  
A2 5.8 0.52 
Light timber frame, non-engineered,  
low rise, medium roof pitch 
A4 4.45 0.4 
Timber and light steel frame 
Industrial/Commercial,  engineered, 
low rise, low roof pitch 
A6 2.7 0.5 
Concrete Frame/Reinforced 
Masonry, non-engineered, low rise, 
medium roof pitch 
A11 10.2 0.53 
Unreinforced Masonry Bearing 
Walls, non-engineered, low rise, 
medium roof pitch 
A21 8.5 0.36 
Concrete Frame  with Unreinforced 
Masonry Infill Walls / Steel Moment 
Frame, engineered, low rise, low 
roof pitch 




Table 16: Attribution of typology-specific vulnerability functions to RiskScape construction classes.   

























10 Concrete Masonry 3.50% 
A29: Steel Moment 
Frame, engineered, 
low rise, low roof 
pitch 





A4: Light timber 
frame, non-engineered, 
medium pitch,  low 
rise 
5 Light Timber 86.80% 
11 Unknown Residential 0.00% 
8 Advanced Design 0.00% 
A6:Timber and light 
steel frame 
Industrial/Commercial, 
engineered, low rise, 
low pitch 
6 Tilt Up Panel 0.80% 




low rise, medium pitch 






The tephra fall vulnerability functions have a cumulative lognormal distribution typical 
of functions used for other hazards (Baker, 2014; Maqsood et al., 2015). The functions 
are calculated using the following equation:  







Where DI is the expected mean damage index reached when a structure is subjected 
to a tephra load  𝑥 (measured in kPa), Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function, 𝜃 is the median of the fragility function (i.e. the tephra load corresponding to 
an IM of 0.5) and 𝛽 is the standard deviation of lnIM. The uncertainty assigned to the 
mean damage index was decided by the Global Assessment project team to be +/- 
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30% of the mean damage index to the 5th and 95th percentile values of the damage 
index respectively. 
 
4.2.3.2 Assigning ballistic functions to buildings 
From ballistic cannon experiments and post-eruption impact assessments the amount 
of damage caused by ballistic impacts to buildings is primarily controlled by the 
ballistic’s impact energy and the impact resistance of the cladding. Therefore, the most 
appropriate attributes within RiskScape’s building asset database to base cladding 
specific ballistic fragility function assignment on are likely to be RiskScape’s ‘roof 
cladding class’ and ‘wall cladding class’ attributes. In addition to ‘cladding class’, the 
‘construction class’ attribute has also been used to determine what type of framing (if 
any exists) could be impacted by ballistics. Three dimensional modelling of exposure 
and hazard determines if a ballistic impact has struck a building’s wall or roof and 
hence, which cladding function should be applied. However, cladding does not cover 
the entire surface of a building so once the impact location has been established there 
are still up to three different types of fragility functions (cladding, framing or window) 
that could be used to model damage from the impact. The process for deciding which 






Figure 56: The decision making process for assigning the appropriate fragility functions based on 
building type and ballistic impact location. Colours signify whether an item pertains to hazard (red), 
exposure (blue) or vulnerability (yellow) 
In RiskScape’s building asset database, there are seven distinct roof cladding classes, 
six of which are impacted by ballistics in this eruption scenario. One suite of functions 
(i.e. DS1, DS2, DS3) has been assigned to each of the cladding classes impacted ( 
Table 17).  Wall claddings have been attributed functions in the same way by matching 
each cladding type listed in the exposure inventory with the most appropriate function 
suite. There are a total of 15 different wall cladding classes recognised in the database, 
nine of which are impacted by ballistics in this scenario (Table 18). If a window is 
impacted then the glass fragility function is used and if a building has framing that is 
modelled to have been impacted then the timber framing fragility functions are used. 
A full list of the function suites and the claddings they are assigned to is given in 
Appendix B5. This list also identifies claddings which are a priority to develop functions 




Table 17: The six roof cladding classes impacted by ballistics in this impact assessment. Note the 
‘membrane’ roof cladding class has been assigned the sheet metal fragility function suite because this 
type of roof cladding is simply a waterproofing layer usually placed over a steel deck.  




Number of  
roof impacts 
Percentage 
 1: Clay/Concrete Tile Tile 109 16.4% 
 2: Concrete Slab RC Slab 6 0.9% 
 3: Membrane Sheet metal 1 0.2% 
 4: Metal Tile Sheet metal 44 6.6% 
 6: Other - Light Plywood 6 0.9% 
 7: Sheet Metal Sheet metal 500 75.2% 
Grand total 665 100% 
 
 Table 18: The nine wall cladding classes impacted by ballistics in this impact assessment.   
RiskScape wall cladding 
class 
Function suite attributed 
Number of wall 
impacts 
Percentage 
1: Weatherboard Weatherboard 66 41.8% 
2: Stucco, Roughcast 
Fibre RC sheet (5th 
percentile) 
11 7.0% 
5: Fibre Cement Sheet Fibre RC sheet 8 5.1% 
6: Fibre Cement Plank 
Fibre RC sheet (5th 
percentile) 
8 5.1% 
7: Reinforced Concrete  RC slab  7 4.4% 
8: Concrete Masonry RC slab (95th percentile) 14 8.9% 
9: Brick RC slab (95th percentile) 38 24.1% 
14: Other Sheet-Non 
Combustible 
Sheet metal 2 1.3% 
15: Other Weatherboard 4 2.5% 
Grand total 158 100% 
 
 
4.2.4 Relating hazard, exposure, and fragility 
To complete an impact assessment the three major components of the impact 
assessment need to be related to each other within a GIS to generate and analyse 
spatial data. The steps required to relate these components for ballistics and tephra 
fall are different. 
108 
 
4.2.4.1 Tephra fall impact assessment GIS process  
The steps required to quantify building damage from tephra fall in ArcMap 10.2 are set 
out below: 
1. Calculate the thickness of tephra on each impacted building. Total accumulated 
tephra thickness is dependent on the thickness of tephra deposited on the roof 
and the percentage of this tephra which sheds from the roof. In turn the 
percentage of tephra which sheds from the roof is dependent on roof pitch and 
cladding. Hampton (2015) conducted experiments measuring the percentage 
of tephra fall that would accumulate on corrugated iron roofing at four different 
roof pitches. By fitting a linear trend line to their experimental results, the 
percentage of tephra remaining on a pitched metal roof after deposition can be 
modelled using the following equation.       
 
% 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 =  −2.41𝑥 + 109 
(3.7 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 90) 
Where the % accumulated is modelled as the remaining thickness of the tephra 
fall deposit on a metal roof with 𝑥 pitch compared to the total tephra fall 
thickness in the area. The negative coefficient of 𝑥 means that increasing pitch 
causes increased tephra shedding from roofs.   
 
2. Calculate the tephra loading on each impacted building using the tephra fall 





Where 𝐿𝐴𝐹 is the tephra fall load (kPa), 𝜌 is the tephra deposit’s bulk density 
(kg/m3), 𝑔 is gravitational acceleration (9.81 m/s2) and ℎ is the tephra deposit 
thickness remaining on the roof (m). 
3. Calculate the cost to repair: cost to replace damage ratio by inputting the tephra 
loading value on each building into that building’s vulnerability function.  
4. Calculate the repair cost in dollars by multiplying each building’s damage ratio 
by the building replacement cost recorded in RiskScape’s building asset 
database.    
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4.2.4.2 Ballistics impact assessment GIS process 
As illustrated in Figure 56, the first step is to identify which buildings have been 
impacted and whether the impact is to the wall or roof. Once a fragility function is 
assigned to each impact, its damage state can be predicted reached by each impact 
are as follows: 
1. Calculate the impact obliquity of each ballistic. Based on impact angle and 
angle of wall/roof surface being impacted. 
2. Using the calculated obliquity value, calculate the normal component of impact 
energy for each ballistic.    
3. Input the normal component of impact energy of each ballistic into its fragility 
function equation to determine the probability of it falling into a given damage 
state.  
4. Compare the probability to a randomly generated number (between 1 and 0) to 
get a discrete number determining which damage state (DS1, DS2 or DS3) has 
occurred. 
5. For buildings with cladding over a reinforced concrete frame, if an impact has 
resulted DS3 to cladding then the residual energy of the ballistic is calculated 
according to Kar (1979) and the damage to the concrete frame may also be 
modelled.   
This type of ballistic impact assessment on its own can only predict the most likely 
damage state from individual impacts. It does not consider the potential for multiple 
impacts to have a compounding effect on damage nor does it consider loss of building 
functionality as a whole. 
 
4.3 Tephra impact assessment results 
Using the Exercise Ruaumoko eruption scenario, >162,000 buildings are impacted by 
tephra fall (>0.1 mm thick) and 468 buildings are impacted by ballistics. All of the 
buildings within the ballistic fallout zone were also impacted by at least 100 mm of 
tephra fall, therefore for an eruption with this large thickness of tephra fall near the 
vent, ballistics may have an effect on a building’s tephra load bearing capacity but their 
impacts can be considered relatively insignificant compared to tephra fall impacts. 
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However, to assess the impact from each hazard individually, a summary for each is 
presented.  
4.3.1 Tephra fall impact assessment results 
Tephra from this eruption covers an area ~500 km2 with a total of 162,108 buildings 
impacted by thicknesses at least 0.1 mm.  Of these impacted buildings, 3-10% are 
modelled to have structural damage. The estimated repair cost associated with 
structural damage ranges from $1.3 to $2.4 billion. This large range is dependent on 
how the tephra loading is calculated for each building’s roof (Table 19). Loading can 
be changed by varying tephra density (kg/m3) or the thickness of deposits resulting 
from different tephra shedding dynamics. Buildings impacted by tephra can be 
separated to assess the number of buildings in different damage ratio ranges (Table 
20).  Table 20 shows that ~97% buildings impacted by tephra receive no structural 
damage.  Figure 57 and Figure 58 show that for even the most vulnerable building 
types, structural damage does not begin to occur until tephra thicknesses of 20 -30 
mm are reached (different thicknesses corresponding to 0.3 KPa loading for 1000 and 
1500 kg/m3 tephra densities respectively).  
Table 19: Modelled structural building damage repair costs for four eruption scenarios with different 
combinations of tephra fall densities and tephra shedding dynamics. 
 Density 
Dry density 
 (1000 kg/m3) 





2. No shedding 
3. Maximum 
shedding 
4. No shedding 
Average damage 
ratio amongst 
damaged buildings  
0.49 0.44 0.40 0.29 
Number of buildings 
damaged 
5621 9,542 7,895 15,986 
Average repair cost 
for damaged 
buildings (NZD) 
233,147 223,877 197,247 152,418 
Total repair cost 
(NZD) 







Table 20: The number of buildings of different use categories in given damage ratio ranges. These 
values are for scenario #1 in dynamics. Table (Maximum shedding, 1000 kg/m2 tephra density).  
Damage ratio range 
Building type 
Totals % 
Residential Commercial Industrial Other 
0-0.001 141293 4313 5465 6799 157870 97.39% 
0.001-0.1 828 16 64 38 946 0.58% 
0.1-0.2 178 3 9 9 199 0.12% 
0.2-0.3 60 2 8 2 72 0.04% 
0.3-0.4 85 1 5 1 92 0.06% 
0.4-0.5 124 0 1 3 128 0.08% 
0.5-0.6 188 0 2 10 200 0.12% 
0.6-0.7 165 0 4 5 174 0.11% 
0.7-0.8 125 2 10 2 139 0.09% 
0.8-0.9 97 5 26 7 135 0.08% 
0.9-1 1926 20 136 71 2153 1.33% 














Though tephra fall thicknesses of 20 mm or less are modelled to cause no structural 
damage, they will still cause significant disruption and damage to non-structural 
building components such as roof guttering, HVAC units, roof and wall coatings and 
satellite dishes. The exposure inventory used in this model doesn’t explicitly identify 
which buildings have these non-structural building components and apart from HVAC 
units there are currently no published vulnerability of fragility functions for these 
components. This means any risk or impact assessment seeking to quantify non-
structural damage must rely on numerous assumptions to account for incomplete 
exposure and vulnerability assessments (e.g. Magill et al., 2006). As the purpose of 
this chapter is to showcase how fragility and vulnerability functions are used in impact 
assessments, approaches relying heavily upon assumptions will not be adopted so 
non-structural building damage from tephra falls has not been modelled. 
 
4.3.2 Ballistic impact assessment results 
Ballistics in this scenario impact on residential and industrial areas up to 1.4 kilometres 
from the vent (Figure 59 and Figure 60). A total of 468 different buildings were 
impacted by 823 ballistics giving an average of ~1.8 hits per building impacted (Table 
21). This scenario displays a pattern of decreasing impacts per unit area with 
increasing distance from the vent and the percentages of buildings being impacted 
decreases accordingly (Table 22). Although most buildings receive 1-2 impacts the 
building receiving the most impacts had 10 strikes to its roof (Figure 61). 
Summary of impacts Totals 
Ballistic strikes to roofs 665 
823 
Ballistic strikes to walls 158 
Buildings with wall strikes 141 
468 
Buildings with roof strikes 446 







Figure 59: Damage states for direct ballistic impacts to roofs. 
 
Figure 60: Damage states for direct ballistic impacts to walls. 
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Metres from vent 0-500  
500-
1000 
1000-1500 0-1500 (total) 
Area (hectares) 78.5 235.6 392.7 706.9 
Ballistics  4134 8536 1018 13688 
Ballistic per 
hectare 
52.7 36.2 2.6 19.4 
Total buildings  34 1233 3052 4319 
Impacted buildings 15 352 101 468 
Percentage 
impacted 
44.12% 28.55% 3.31% 9.23% 




Figure 61: Ballistic impacts per building. 
Of all the ballistic impacts to buildings, >92% were modelled to cause DS3 perforations 
to the buildings they impacted. However, there is a significant difference between roof 
and wall impacts where perforations occurred in 98% and 67.5% of impacts 
respectively (Table 23 and Table 24). The cause of this difference can be mostly 
attributed to two factors. The first being that wall impacts had higher obliquities than 
roof impacts, averaging to 66° and 29° respectively. In calculating the normal 
component of velocity a 66° obliquity equates to a 60% reduction in the normal 
component of velocity whereas a 29° obliquity equates to only a 12% reduction. The 
second factor contributing to a lower percentage of wall perforations is the higher 


























Ballistic impacts per building
Ballistic impacts per building
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masonry and bricks which are more resistant to perforation than the claddings used in 
roofs which are typically lighter (4% of walls compared to 0.8% of roofs). 
 
Damage Type Totals % % combined 
Sum of Framing DS 1 4 0.6% 
1.2% 
Sum of Cladding DS 1  4 0.6% 
Sum of Framing DS 2 1 0.2% 
0.8% 
Sum of Cladding DS 2 4 0.6% 
Sum of Framing DS 3 355 53.4% 
98.0% 
Sum of Cladding DS 3 297 44.7% 
Totals 665 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 23: Damage state distribution for ballistic impacts to roofs. 
Damage type Totals % % combined 
Cladding DS 1 4 2.4% 
24.1% Framing DS 1 33 19.9% 
RC backing DS 1 3 1.8% 
Cladding DS 2 0 0.0% 
8.4% Framing DS 2 12 7.2% 
RC backing DS 2 2 1.2% 
Window DS 3 29 17.5% 
67.5% 
Cladding DS 3 38 22.9% 
Framing DS 3 42 25.3% 
RC backing DS 3 3 1.8% 
Totals 166 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 24: Damage state distribution for ballistic impacts to walls. 
Despite nearly all of the impacting ballistics being able to cause roof punctures the 
area of damage caused by these punctures may be relatively low. Using the diameter 
of each impacting ballistic, it was found that punctures caused by these sum to an 
average of <0.2% per building (assuming punctures are roughly the same size as the 
ballistic that caused them). The building with the highest coverage by ballistics was a 
small building impacted by one large, 63 centimetre diameter ballistic whose puncture 
would account for 1.3% of the house’s footprint. Punctures to this quantity of a 
building’s footprint are considered to be repairable so long as the impact doesn’t strike 
in an area causing damage to key structural components of the building, such as 
purlins or king trusses (identified as important roof framing structures by Pomonis et 
al. (1999)). Aside from the repair cost of a roof, another impact metric to consider is 
the building’s functionality. A complete puncture of the building envelope leaves a 
building more vulnerable to subsequent tephra contamination and moisture damage, 
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potentially for months or even years after the initial eruption should evacuation cordons 
remain in place for the duration of extended periods of volcanism.    
 
4.4 Limitations and assumptions 
The damage predictions from impact assessments such as these are useful for 
identifying and quantifying possible impacts to aid in future risk reduction measures. 
However, it is important to acknowledge the inherent limitations and assumptions of 
this impact assessment and the uncertainty they bring to any loss predictions. Some 
assumptions are required when modelling the interactions between tephra fall, 
ballistics and a large number of buildings. Every assumption reduces the accuracy of 
the model and is likely to contribute to either an underestimation or an overestimation 
of the overall impact to buildings. Assumptions for the tephra fall and ballistic impact 
assessments have been summarised in Table 25 and Table 26 respectively. A full 
explanation of these assumptions can be found in Appendix B7.    
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Table 25: Assumptions and limitations of different components of the tephra fall impact assessment and their implications for the model’s results. 
 
Assumption /limitation 
Implication for loss estimates  
Under estimation Over estimation Unknown 
Hazard model 
Modelled eruption isopachs (not past eruption isopachs)      
Deterministic hazard assessment with unusual wind profile used in the modelling       
Changing density or grainsize distribution with distance  from vent not modelled      
Exposure inventory 
Over 25% of building footprints have no data attributed       
Exposure of non-structural building components not captured       
Vulnerability model 
Functions produced solely using expert elicitation data and are yet to be validated        
Functions only consider structural damage  (>100 mm/ 0.3 kPa)       
Functions ignore the higher load bearing capacity of steeply pitched roofs         
Relating hazard, exposure and vulnerability 
One end-member scenario models zero shedding (wet tephra)       
One end-member scenario models maximum shedding (dry tephra)       
Wind remobilisation of tephra from roofs not considered       








Table 26: Assumptions and limitations of different components of the ballistic impact assessment and their implications for the model’s results. 
Assumption/limitation 
Implication for loss estimates  
Under estimation Over estimation Unknown 
Hazard model 
No consideration of impact temperature and potential fire hazard        
No consideration of ballistic bomb impacts        
No particle collisions modelled       
No consideration water's effect on the initial flight path       
Only direct impacts modelled no modelling of ricocheting/bouncing ballistics       
Exposure inventory 
Most common claddings attributed to buildings with no roof cladding data         
Flat topped buildings with roofs not extruded into 3D       
Exposure of non-structural building elements not considered        
Window:cladding ratio for all buildings based on residential building analysis only        
Vulnerability model 
Some functions attributed to claddings they were not specifically made for       
Normal component of impact energy doesn’t consider shear stress component     
Functions used were developed from limited data         
Relating hazard, exposure and vulnerability 
Impacts to successive layers (e.g. roof-floor or roof-wall) not modelled       
Residual energy = impact energy - perforation threshold       
Perforating ballistics assumed to stay fully intact       
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4.5 Discussion  
The repair cost of structural building damage from tephra fall and ballistic impacts for 
an eruption of this magnitude is likely to be in excess of $450 million, with the majority 
of this cost being from tephra fall. In addition to structural damages, non-structural 
damages caused by light tephra loads are expected to be widespread and therefore 
their total cumulative cost is likely to be significant.  
Of all the buildings impacted by tephra fall in this scenario, less than 3% experience 
structural damage. This highlights the need for quantification of non-structural building 
components’ vulnerability to light tephra falls. The cost of non-structural damage is 
likely to be relatively low for individual properties but because of the large numbers of 
impacted buildings it is important that these estimates be as accurate as possible as 
they have important implications for insurance and construction sectors and for the 
large number of affected communities.  
More research is required to quantify non-structural damage caused by tephra fall 
without relying heavily on assumptions as previous work has done (e.g. Magill et al 
2006). In particular this requires the development of fragility functions for several key 
building components which are vulnerable to impacts from light tephra falls (outlined 
in Table 3). To match improvements in the development of vulnerability, exposure 
inventories must also be enhanced with additional information regarding which 
buildings actually have these vulnerable building components.  
Another aspect of tephra impacts to buildings that this impact assessment has 
identified as an area for future research is the relationship between roof pitch and a 
roof’s ability to facilitate tephra shedding. This has implications not only for structural 
damage from tephra loading to roofs but also for non-structural damage to the gutters 
which tephra is shed into.  
From the ballistic impact assessment, it has become apparent that in order to provide 
a more meaningful prediction of possible impacts, there is a need to translate specific 
damages (e.g. number of perforations per building footprint area), into an overall 
impact state for buildings as a whole (e.g. minor roof repair required or building 
uninhabitable). This could utilise an approach where vulnerability is modelled using 
two sets of fragility functions in succession. The first set would predict the specific 
damage state from each ballistic impact as the functions produced in this thesis do. A 
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second set would predict what generic impact state each building falls into based on 
the damage it has received. This approach would be especially useful in eruption 
scenarios such as this one where over 90% of ballistic strikes are modelled to have 
caused perforation of the building envelope. For this second set of fragility functions, 
perforation density per building footprint area could be used as the HIM. Using this 
HIM, one approach to developing impact state fragility functions may be to base impact 
state exceedance probabilities on the probability that a given perforation density will 
have individual ballistics striking critical areas of a building. These may be areas where 
a ballistic perforation destroys a critical section of the building’s framing or destroys 
plumbing or ruptures gas lines and water cylinders etc.  
Another area of future work for any ballistic impact assessment is to automate the 
modelling process so that it may be repeated with enough iterations to complete a 
Monte Carlo analysis and allow this work to develop from a deterministic impact 
assessment into a probabilistic risk assessment.  Also further modelling and research 
is required to assess the multi-hazard impacts of ballistics and tephra fall (and other 
near vent hazards) combined. Ballistic and tephra fall hazards have been observed to 
interact and influence the total building damage a building receives but thus far this 
research is only anecdotal (e.g. increased tephra ingress through ballistic perforations 
(Mt Usu, 2000) or tephra deposits shielding roofs from ballistic perforation (Mt Ontake, 
2014)  (Fitzgerald et al. in prep)). Other possible interactions are only theoretical at 
this stage, such as the potential for a building already weakened by ballistics to have 
a lower tephra load bearing capacity or the potential for perforations to increase a 
building’s vulnerability to damage from high internal pressures caused by pyroclastic 
density currents (as is the case for wind loading on windborne debris perforations in 
hurricanes (Herbin and Barbato, 2012)).  The large number of combinations and the 
temporal aspects of multi-hazard impacts means fragility functions with a single hazard 
intensity measure are not well suited to modelling impacts. Instead of using functions, 
multi-hazard impacts may instead rely on expert judgement to apply a set of logical 




Chapter 5 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis is to quantitatively assess the vulnerability of Auckland city’s 
buildings to tephra hazards. To achieve this aim, the objectives stated in Chapter 1 
have been completed (Table 27). The thesis reviews previous instances of tephra 
impacts to buildings, identifying research gaps in building vulnerability for both ballistic 
and tephra fall hazards.  The thesis focuses on ballistic impacts to buildings by: a) 
summarising the findings of a post-eruption ballistic impact assessment trip to Japan 
to characterise ballistic impacts to a built up areas and to identify appropriate life safety 
actions; and b)  undertaking and analysing novel ballistic cannon experiments to 
quantify building vulnerability. This research was used to inform fragility and 
vulnerability functions used for a tephra-building impact assessment in Auckland city, 
New Zealand.  
Table 27: Objectives stated in Chapter 1 and their outcomes.  
  Objectives Outcomes 
Objective 1 
To develop a framework that guides the 
derivation of tephra fall and ballistic 
fragility functions for buildings 
Framework developed and research gaps 
identified 
Objective 2 
To improve understanding of building 
vulnerability to tephra hazard  
Derived new ballistic fragility functions and 
identified tephra fall vulnerability 
functions applicable to New Zealand 
buildings 
Objective 3 
To  conduct a tephra-building impact 
assessment using a typical AVF eruption 
scenario 
Quantitative impact assessment 
conducted applying  new fragility and 
vulnerability functions to Auckland 
buildings 
 
5.1.1 Quantifying ballistic impacts and building vulnerability 
This thesis has taken a significant step to improve knowledge of ballistic impacts to 
buildings, particularly in terms of quantitative impact/risk assessments. Ballistic 
impacts to buildings have been largely overlooked by researchers because of (1) their 
relatively limited range, and volcanic risk management’s focus on life safety and 
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evacuation, and (2) the incorrect perception that ballistics have binary impacts to 
buildings, wherein any impact to a building will result in its destruction. Observation of 
ballistic impacts in the field and in the literature show that this is not the case. Our data 
from Japan shows that a building can experience multiple impacts without being 
destroyed and even though our testing found that building materials are highly 
vulnerable to perforation by large dense blocks, ballistic impacts per area are rarely 
high enough to cause complete destruction of a building.  
As part of quantifying building vulnerability to ballistic impacts this thesis has 
developed the first ballistic-building fragility functions (to the best of the author’s 
knowledge).  Claddings tested were found to be most vulnerable to perpendicular 
impacts but increasing impact obliquity sharply reduced the probability of a ballistic 
strike resulting in perforation (yet lower damage states still occurred at surprisingly low 
energies). As expected, reinforced concrete roof slabs were the most resilient cladding 
material tested and no ballistics were able to fully perforate slabs due to the strength 
of reinforcing bars. However impacts were strong enough to eject fragments from the 
back face with velocities equal to ~25% the velocity of the impacting ballistic, fast 
enough to threaten lives and damage property inside reinforced concrete buildings. In 
addition to developing fragility functions, testing and post eruption impact assessments 
were able to provide information on appropriate life safety actions people should take 
if sheltering from ballistic impacts in buildings.  
5.1.2 Ballistics and tephra fall impact assessment  
A ballistic impact assessment has been carried out for buildings in Auckland following 
a Vulcanian phreatic eruption from ‘Ruaumoko Volcano’. In this particular scenario, 
over 400 buildings were impacted by 844 ballistics and fragility functions predicted 
over 90% of impacts resulted in perforation. Despite this, the overall damaged area on 
each impacted building was low enough that they could probably all be economically 
repaired, assuming no significant further damage was sustained from hazards.  
Tephra impacts to buildings were also assessed for this eruption from a different 
approach of using vulnerability functions. Impacts from tephra fall were found to be 
significantly more widespread and severe than for ballistics with >0.1mm of tephra 
impacting over 200,000 buildings in Greater Auckland. For 2000-3000 buildings, 
modelled tephra loads were high enough to cause structural damage with repair costs 
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ranging from $450 million to $1.2 billion depending on tephra density and the 
percentage of tephra fall remaining accumulated on roofs. As the tephra fall-building 
vulnerability functions only record structural damage, buildings receiving tephra loads 
of less than 0.3 kPa (equivalent thickness 20 – 30 mm) were modelled to have 
sustained no damage. Buildings in this category represent over 95% of all buildings 
impacted by tephra for this eruption, but because tephra fall vulnerability research has 
yet to quantify the vulnerability of non-structural building components to light tephra 
falls, losses have not been modelled for this large majority of buildings. 
5.2 Recommendations 
5.2.1 General guidelines for designing tephra resistant buildings and 
sheltering in place from ballistics 
For buildings to increase their resistance to tephra impacts they should have several 
of the following design features including: 
 Steeply pitched roofs, (over 35°) made of a smooth material with a relatively high 
impact resistance to ballistic strikes such as corrugated iron.  This will facilitate tephra 
shedding and increase the overall load the building can support.  
 Well-constructed doorways and windows with tight seals to minimise ash 
ingress following an eruption. 
 Gutters that are easily detachable so they may be completely removed prior to 
eruptions or  
 Sections of the building exterior against which a ladder can be safely placed so 
tephra removal from the roof can be carried out without risk of crushing gutters.  
Though reinforced concrete showed a significantly higher impact resistance than all 
other materials tested, the cost of concrete compared to typical timber framed 
construction makes it unfeasible to advise Auckland’s future buildings be constructed 
using RC slabs. However in the event of a short lead in time for a future AVF eruption 
where evacuations cannot be fully conducted prior to the eruption, it would be 
beneficial for emergency planners to have already identified buildings across Auckland 
which are exceedingly resistant to ballistic strikes and other volcanic hazards. Such 
buildings would ideally have multiple storeys of reinforced concrete (e.g. parking 
buildings).   
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Should people be forced to shelter from ballistics inside unreinforced buildings, they 
should seek to put as many layers of building materials as possible between 
themselves and incoming ballistics by positioning themselves behind, under or inside 
robust furniture on the side of the building furthest from the erupting vent.  
 
5.2.2 Future research directions 
Research directions related to tephra fall-building vulnerability which can contribute 
towards disaster risk reduction have been identified: 
1. The vulnerability of non-structural building components to tephra fall hazards 
still needs to be assessed. To better understand potential impacts and the costs 
associated with repairs, further research into the factors influencing impacts 
and fragility/vulnerability function development for each component would be 
beneficial.  
2. A better understanding in-particular of how susceptible New Zealand buildings 
are to interior contamination by ash and how easily gutters become 
blocked/broken by tephra shedding off different roof claddings will provide 
useful information for assessment of structural and non-structural building 
damage. 
  
As knowledge of ballistic hazard and risk is relatively immature there are a number of 
research directions that can be taken to contribute towards overall volcanic disaster 
risk reduction. Several research directions have been identified: 
1. It has been demonstrated that depending on their mass, the majority of ballistic 
impacts will cause perforation to the building envelope of unreinforced 
buildings. In light of this, it would be beneficial to develop a second tier of 
ballistic-building fragility functions which express the conditional probability of 
the building falling into a specific impact state (e.g. minor repairs required, 
building partially collapsed) in relation to its perforation density  (e.g. number of 
perforations per unit area).  
2. In terms of ballistic hazard modelling, now that ballistic trajectories can be 
modelled accounting for the collision of one ballistic with another, this capacity 
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should be extended to model the potential bounce, ricochet or shattering of a 
ballistic after it collides with the ground or with a building. This additional 
modelling will give a clearer picture of the area of ballistic hazard on the ground, 
rather than simply representing the hazard from each ballistic using only its 
initial impact point. 
3. The ballistic impact assessment in this thesis has been carried in only one 
location using one eruption scenario. Ideally for situations such as Auckland’s, 
where the locations of future eruptions are unknown, a probabilistic risk 
assessment would be carried out using a range of eruption scenarios producing 
ballistics in different locations within the AVF to identify areas at greatest risk. 
In order to repeat this assessment thousands of times as part of probabilistic 
risk assessment, the process of assigning fragility functions and measuring 
impacts must first be automated.  
4. While the impacts of ballistic blocks to building claddings have been 
investigated in this thesis, the impact of ballistic bombs remains  uncertain, both 
in terms of a typically slower moving and deformable ballistic’s ability to 
perforate claddings and in terms of the fire risk they present due to their high 
thermal energies. 
5. Testing has been carried out using an air cannon which cannot simulate the 
speeds of most ballistics from real eruptions and it has only tested sections of 
wall claddings rather than claddings which are part of a real building. To 
produce higher quality ballistic-building vulnerability data a larger cannon is 
being built, capable of launching rocks at over 100 m/s and relationships have 
been established with a local Christchurch demolition company to procure a 
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Appendix A – Formation and Dispersal of 
Tephra 
Tephra is the collective term used to describe all lava and rock fragments ejected by 
explosive volcanic eruptions (Le Maitre, 2002). Explosions are driven by the expansion 
of exsolved magmatic gasses as they rise to the surface (Cashman et al., 2000). The 
explosions produce fragments of lava and lithics which can be categorised into three 
tephra size ranges; ash (<2 mm), lapilli (2-64 mm) and bomb/blocks (>64 mm). Due 
to their different sizes and bulk densities, tephra fall and ballistics are dispersed and 
deposited through vastly different physical processes. Their dispersion patterns 
strongly control their impacts on society (Wilson et al., 2015). 
Dispersal of tephra fall 
Tephra fall is the most frequently occurring volcanic hazard, with tephra fall produced 
in 90% of all eruptions (Newhall and Hoblitt, 2002). Tephra fall is a geographically 
widespread hazard with the potential to affect communities over hundreds of square 
kilometres depending on eruption magnitude, wind conditions, tephra density and 
grain size (Wilson et al., 2015). Volcanic tephra fall can be initially transported away 
from the volcano via two different transport processes. Tephra can travel in co-
ignimbrite plumes formed by pyroclastic density currents, or larger volumes can be 
transported over more widespread areas in convective eruption plumes (Carey and 
Bursik, 2000).  
The base of a convective eruption plume is called the jet thrust zone (Figure 62). Here 
tephra and gas are ejected into the atmosphere at high velocity by explosions. The jet 
thrust zone has a bulk density higher than that of the surrounding atmosphere but 
tephra continues to rise due its momentum from the explosion. As the plume rises it 
entrains air, leading to an increase in plume size but decrease in velocity and bulk 
density. The entrained air becomes heated, making the plume less dense than the 
surrounding atmosphere and allowing it to rise by convection in the aptly named, 
convection zone. The plume will continue to convect upwards until its density becomes 
equal to that of the surrounding atmosphere through continual entrainment and 
cooling. This area of the plume is called the umbrella zone and from here tephra can 
move laterally, sometimes up to thousands of kilometres (Carey and Sparks, 1986; 
Wilson et al., 2012). 
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After tephra reaches the umbrella zone, tephra fallout occurs in three stages (Rose et 
al., 2001). Coarse tephra fall closest to the source during the first stage which can last 
1-2 hours. During the second phase, the fallout of aggregated tephra particles occurs, 
rapidly reducing the concentration of fine and very fine of grained ash particles over a 
period of up to 24 hours. In the third stage, the concentration of tephra in the umbrella 
zone has been depleted but the remainder of the plume can travel downwind of the 
source for thousands of kilometres. This pattern of fallout typically produces tephra fall 
deposits with thicknesses and grain sizes which decrease, either exponentially (Pyle, 
1989), or according to a power-law trend (Bonadonna and Houghton, 2005).  
 
 
Figure 62: The typical structure of an eruption plume formed by fragmentation of silicic magma. After 
pyroclasts are ejected from the vent a plume develops with three distinct zones: the gas thrust zone; 
the convective zone; and the umbrella zone. Figure from Wilson(Wilson, 2011),  originally modified 
from Carey and Bursik (2000). 
Dispersal of ballistics  
Compared to tephra fall, ballistics are a proximal hazard, typically landing within a 5-
km radius of the vent and rarely landing >10 km (Blong, 1984). Unlike tephra fall, 
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ballistics do not remain suspended in an eruption plume after they are erupted. 
Following explosions, gas and fine ash in the jet phase of the plume quickly lose their 
initial momentum. Larger particles on the other hand have higher inertia, allowing them 
to maintain their momentum and become decoupled from the plume to be ejected with 
near parabolic, ballistic trajectories (Fagents and Wilson, 1993; Mastin, 2001; Harris 
et al., 2012). Ballistic size is typically measured by the clast’s diameter and values can 
vary from a few centimetres to >10 metres in size (Figure 63). Ballistic clasts of 
different sizes will typically be normally laterally graded (i.e.  average ballistic diameter 
will decrease with distance from the vent) (Fagents et al., 2013). However, in some 
eruptions the opposite has occurred (e.g. Asama Volcano, 1938 (Minakami, 1942); 
Ukinrek Maar, 1977 (Self et al., 1980) and Upper Te Maari, 2012 (Breard et al., 2014). 
Reverse lateral size grading is thought to occur due to the complex drag interactions 
between ballistics and the expanding pyroclastic mixture  that surrounds them near 
the vent (Self et al., 1980; Capaccioni and Cuccoli, 2005; De’Michieli Vitturi et al., 
2010). 
 
Figure 63: Ballistics of various sizes distributed across the Abuta-Gunn highway after the 2000 




Another factor influencing the size distribution of ballistic particles is particle collision 
(Tsunematsu et al., 2014). The Tsunematsu study found that a ballistic’s maximum 
range could be increased by a factor of two to six due to the energy transfer that occurs 
when a relatively small particle is struck by a larger particle, under the right conditions 
(Figure 64).  
The style and magnitude of eruption also have a strong influence on ballistic 
distribution patterns. Some important aspects of ballistic hazard which are influenced 
by eruption style and magnitude include the number of ballistics ejected, the maximum 
distance they’re ejected and what type of ballistic is ejected.  Ballistics can occur as 
solid blocks or semi-molten bombs depending on eruption style. Ballistic blocks are 
made up of rocks which surround or overlay the vent before becoming fractured and 
ejected by explosions (Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al., 2016). Ballistic bombs are made 
up of clots of unsolidified lava, so they are only produced by eruption styles which 
have a magmatic component such as hawaiian, strombolian and phreatomagmatic 
eruptions (Fisher and Schmincke, 1984).  
 
 
Figure 64: Illustration of modelled ballistic trajectories with and without particle collision. The small 
white circle represents a particle which has a mass of 3 kg. The larger black disk represents a particle 
that has a mass of 81 kg and was ejected 4.8 s after the white circle. (A) shows the trajectories that 
would be taken by particles if collision is ignored. (B) shows the particle positions at the moment of 
particle collision. Solid and dashed lines illustrate particle trajectories taken before and after collision 
respectively. The velocities of both particles, at the moments immediately before and after collision 








The initial velocity of ballistics varies with different eruption types. The highest reported 
velocities for phreatic eruptions range up to 380-400 m/s for eruptions from Mount 
Ngauruhoe, New Zealand; Arenal Volcano, Costa Rica and Hole-in-the ground Maar, 
USA (Nairn and Self, 1978; Steinberg and Babenko, 1978; Fagents and Wilson, 1993). 
For Strombolian eruptions, the maximum initial velocities are generally lower than for 
phreatic eruptions. Velocities are typically below 100 m/s but speeds of 150 m/s and 
between 172-405 m/s have been calculated for Paricutin (Pioli et al., 2008) and 
Stromboli respectively (Taddeucci et al., 2012). The impact velocities of ballistics are 
typically much lower than their initial velocities due to drag as the particle moves 
through the air. However despite air drag causing ballistics to decelerate during flight, 
if a clast is ejected high enough to attain terminal velocity during its fall then it can still 
have a relatively high impact velocity (depending on its mass and density). Capaccioni 
and Cuccoli (2005) presented trajectory and velocity profiles for particles ejected under 
different conditions as part of their pyroclast cooling model (Figure 65). Figure 65 
highlights how several different properties of a ballistic influence ballistic trajectory and 
in particular, it also illustrates the time taken for a particle of a certain size, shape and 
density to reach its terminal velocity.   
 
Figure 65: Trajectory and velocity profiles for different particles as a function of ejection velocity (A 
and B) and particle size (C and D). From A and B, note that the particle ejected at 100 m/s was not 
ejected high enough to attain terminal velocity during its fall.  From C and D note that for highly 
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explosive eruptions (300 m/s initial velocity)  even the smallest (64 mm diameter) ballistics can attain 
relatively high velocities of 50 m/s. Modified from Capaccioni and Cuccoli (2005).   
The relatively high mass and final velocity of many ballistic projectiles means they 
have high kinetic energies when they land. Kinetic energies >80 joules impacting 
humans are considered lethal, from a study by Baxter and Gresham (1997) suggesting 
that a ballistic travelling at 6-13 m/s and weighing 10 kg carries a 90% probability of 
death. The authors made these suggestions after conducting autopsies on 5 of the 9 
people killed in the 14 January, 1993 eruption of Galeras Volcano, Colombia. Autopsy 
reports found that “flying rocks” were responsible for all of the deaths. Common injuries 
to humans from the ballistic impacts included severe lacerations and destruction of the 
subject’s skull. The impact energy threshold for skull fracture causing death is ~100 J 
(Raymond et al., 2009), given that ballistic impacts have been observed to cause 
perforation of reinforced concrete slabs which have an estimated perforation threshold 
of 4000 – 10,000 joules (Blong, 1981; Spence et al., 2005a) ballistics constitute a 




Table 1: Literature review of ballistic model input parameters carried out by Rebecca Fitzgerald (90%) 




Appendix B – Electronic Appendix 
 
Refer to the accompanying media for the following: 
1. Cannon experiment photos 
2. Cannon experiment spreadsheets 
3. Cannon experiment graphs of raw data 
4. Fragility function suites 
5. StreetView window coverage analysis 
6. Tephra impact assessment spreadsheets 
7. Tephra impact assessment modelling limitations 
 
